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Abstract. In this work we study the feasibility of knowledge extraction for succinct non-interactive
arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) in a scenario that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
analyzed before. While prior work focuses on the case of adversarial provers that may receive (statically
generated) auxiliary information, here we consider the scenario where adversarial provers are given
access to an oracle. For this setting we study if and under what assumptions such provers can admit
an extractor. Our contribution is mainly threefold.
First, we formalize the question of extraction in the presence of oracles by proposing a suitable proof of
knowledge definition for this setting. We call SNARKs satisfying this definition O-SNARKs. Second, we
show how to use O-SNARKs to obtain formal and intuitive security proofs for three applications (ho-
momorphic signatures, succinct functional signatures, and SNARKs on authenticated data) where we
recognize an issue while doing the proof under the standard proof of knowledge definition of SNARKs.
Third, we study whether O-SNARKs exist, providing both negative and positive results. On the neg-
ative side, we show that, assuming one way functions, there do not exist O-SNARKs in the standard
model for every signing oracle family (and thus for general oracle families as well). On the positive
side, we show that when considering signature schemes with appropriate restrictions on the message
length O-SNARKs for the corresponding signing oracles exist, based on classical SNARKs and assuming
extraction with respect to specific distributions of auxiliary input.
? This article is based on an earlier article which appears in the proceedings of TCC 2016-B, c© IACR 2016.
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1 Introduction
Succinct Arguments. Proof systems [GMR89] are fundamental in theoretical computer science
and cryptography. Extensively studied aspects of proof systems are the expressivity of provable
statements and the efficiency. Related to efficiency, it has been shown that statistically-sound
proof systems are unlikely to allow for significant improvements in communication [BHZ87, GH98,
GVW02, Wee05]. When considering proof systems for NP this means that, unless some complexity-
theoretic collapses occur, in a statistically sound proof system any prover has to communicate,
roughly, as much information as the size of the NP witness. The search of ways to beat this bound
motivated the study of computationally-sound proof systems, also called argument systems [BCC88].
Assuming existence of collision-resistant hash functions, Kilian [Kil92] showed a four-message in-
teractive argument for NP. In this protocol, membership of an instance x in an NP language
with NP machine M can be proven with communication and verifier’s running time bounded by
p(λ, |M |, |x|, log t), where λ is a security parameter, t is the NP verification time of machine M for
the instance x, and p is a universal polynomial. Argument systems of this kind are called succinct.
Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments. Starting from Kilian’s protocol, Micali [Mic94] con-
structed a one-message succinct argument for NP whose soundness is set in the random oracle
model. The fact that one-message succinct arguments are unlikely to exist for hard-enough lan-
guages in the plain model motivated the consideration of two-message non-interactive arguments,
in which the verifier generates its message (a common reference string, if this can be made pub-
licly available) ahead of time and independently of the statement to be proved. Such systems
are called succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) [GW11]. Several SNARGs constructions
have been proposed [CL08, Mie08, Gro10, BCCT12, Lip12, BCC+14, GGPR13, BCI+13, PHGR13,
BSCG+13, BCTV14] and the area of SNARGs has become popular in the last years with the pro-
posal of constructions which gained significant improvements in efficiency. Noteworthy is that all
such constructions are based on non-falsifiable assumptions [Nao03], a class of assumptions that is
likely to be inherent in proving the security of SNARGs (without random oracles), as shown by
Gentry and Wichs [GW11].
Almost all SNARGs are also arguments of knowledge—so called SNARKs [BCCT12, BCC+14].
Intuitively speaking, this property (which replaces soundness) says that every prover producing a
convincing proof must “know” a witness. On the one hand, proof of knowledge turns out to be useful
in many applications, such as delegation of computation where the untrusted worker contributes its
own input to the computation, or recursive proof composition [Val08, BCCT13]. On the other hand,
the formalization of proof of knowledge in SNARKs is a delicate point. Typically, the concept that
the prover “must know” a witness is expressed by assuming that such knowledge can be efficiently
extracted from the prover by means of a so-called knowledge extractor. In SNARKs, extractors
are inherently non-black-box and proof of knowledge requires that for every adversarial prover A
generating an accepting proof π there must be an extractor EA that, given the same input of A,
outputs a valid witness.
Extraction with Auxiliary Input. Unfortunately, stated as above, proof of knowledge is insuf-
ficient for being used in many applications. The problem is that, when using SNARKs in larger
cryptographic protocols, adversarial provers may get additional information which can contribute
to the generation of adversarial proofs. To address this problem, a stronger, and more useful, defi-
nition of proof of knowledge requires that for any adversary A there is an extractor EA such that,
for any honestly generated crs and any polynomial-size auxiliary input aux , whenever A(crs, aux )
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returns an accepting proof, EA(crs, aux ) outputs a valid witness. This type of definition is certainly
more adequate when using SNARKs in larger cryptographic protocols, but it also introduces other
subtleties. As first discussed in [HT98], extraction in the presence of arbitrary auxiliary input can be
problematic, if not implausible. Formal evidence of this issue has been recently given in [BCPR14,
BP15]. Bitansky et al. [BCPR14] show that, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation, there do
not exist extractable one-way functions (and thus SNARKs) with respect to arbitrary auxiliary
input of unbounded polynomial length. Boyle and Pass [BP15] generalize this result showing that
assuming collision-resistant hash functions and differing-input obfuscation, there is a fixed auxiliary
input distribution for which extractable one-way functions do not exist.
1.1 Extraction in the Presence of Oracles
In this work we continue the study on the feasibility of extraction by looking at a scenario that, to
the best of our knowledge, has not been explicitly analyzed before. We consider the case in which
adversarial provers run in interactive security experiments where they are given access to an oracle.
For this setting we study if and under what assumptions such provers can admit an extractor.
Before giving more detail on our results, let us discuss a motivation for analyzing this scenario.
To keep the presentation simple, here we give a motivation via a hypotetical example; more concrete
applications are discussed later.
A case study application. Consider an application where Alice gets a collection of signatures
generated by Bob, and she has to prove to a third party that she owns a valid signature of Bob
on some message m such that P (m) = 1. Let us say that this application is secure if Alice, after
asking for signatures on several messages, cannot cheat letting the third party accept for a false
statement (i.e., P (m) = 0, or P (m) = 1 but Alice did not receive a signature on m). If messages
are large and one wants to optimize bandwidth, SNARKs can be a perfect candidate solution for
doing such proofs,3 i.e., Alice can generate a proof of knowledge of (m,σ) such that “(m,σ) verifies
with Bob’s public key and P (m) = 1”.
An attempt of security proof. Intuitively, the security of this protocol should follow easily
from the proof of knowledge of the SNARK and the unforgeability of the signature scheme. However,
somewhat surprisingly, the proof becomes quite subtle. Let us consider a cheating Alice that always
outputs a proof for a statement in the language.4 If Alice is still cheating, then it must be that
she is using a signature on a message that she did not query – in other words a forgery. Then one
would like to reduce such a cheating Alice to a forger for the signature scheme. To do this, one
would proceed as follows. For any Alice one defines a forger that, on input the verification key
vk, generates the SNARK crs, gives (crs, vk) to Alice, and simulate’s Alice’s queries using its own
signing oracle. When Alice comes with the cheating proof, the forger would need an extractor for
Alice in order to obtain the forgery from her. However, even if we see Alice as a SNARK prover with
auxiliary input vk, Alice does not quite fit the proof of knowledge definition in which adversaries
have no oracles. To handle similar cases, one typically shows that for every, interactive, Alice there
is a non-interactive algorithm B that runs Alice simulating her oracles (i.e., B samples the signing
key) and returns the same output. The good news is that for such B one can claim the existence
of an extractor EB as it fits the proof of knowledge definition. The issue is though that EB expects
3 Further motivation can be to keep the privacy of m by relying on zero-knowledge SNARKs.
4 The other case of statements not in the language can be easily reduced to the soundness of the SNARK.
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the same input of B, which includes the secret signing key. This means that our candidate forger
mentioned above (which does not have the secret key) cannot run EB.
Applications that need extraction with oracles. Besides the above example, this issue
can show up essentially in every application of SNARKs in which adversaries have access to oracles
with a secret state, and one needs to run an extractor during an experiment (e.g., a reduction)
where the secret state of the oracle is not available. For instance, we recognize this issue while
trying to formally prove the security of a “folklore” construction of homomorphic signatures based
on SNARKs and digital signatures that is mentioned in several papers (e.g., [BF11, GW13, CF13,
GVW15]). The same issue appears in a generic construction of SNARKs on authenticated data
in [BBFR15] (also informally discussed in [BCCT12]), where the security proof uses the existence
of an extractor for the oracle-aided prover, but without giving particular justification. A similar
issue also appears in the construction of succinct functional signatures of [BGI14]. To be precise,
in [BGI14] the authors provide a (valid) proof but under a stronger definition of SNARKs in which
the adversarial prover and the extractor are independent PPT machines without common auxiliary
input: a notion for which we are not aware of standard model constructions. In contrast, if one
attempts to prove the succinct functional signatures of [BGI14] using the standard definition of
SNARKs, one incurs the same issues illustrated above, i.e., the proof would not go through.
In this work we address this problem by providing both negative and positive results to the
feasibility of extraction in the presence of oracles. On one hand, our negative results provide an
explanation of why the above proofs do not go through so easily. On the other hand, our pos-
itive results eventually provide some guidelines to formally state and prove the security of the
cryptographic constructions mentioned above (albeit with various restrictions).
1.2 An Overview of Our Results
Defining SNARKs in the presence of oracles. As a first step, we formalize the definition
of non-black-box extraction in the presence of oracles by proposing a notion of SNARKs in the
presence of oracles (O-SNARKs, for short). In a nutshell, an O-SNARK is like a SNARK except
that adaptive proof of knowledge must hold with respect to adversaries that have access to an
oracle O sampled from some oracle family O.5 Slightly more in detail, we require that for any
adversary AO with access to O there is an extractor EA such that, whenever AO outputs a valid
proof, EA outputs a valid witness, by running on the same input of A, plus the transcript of oracle
queries-answers of A.
Existence of O-SNARKs. Once having defined their notion, we study whether O-SNARKs exist
and under what assumptions. Below we summarize our results.
O-SNARKs in the random oracle model. As a first positive result, we show that the con-
struction of Computationally Sounds (CS) proofs of Micali [Mic00] yields an O-SNARK for every
oracle family, in the random oracle model. This result follows from the work of Valiant [Val08] which
shows that Micali’s construction already allows for extraction. More precisely, using the power of
the random oracle model, Valiant shows a black-box extractor. This powerful extractor can then be
used to build an O-SNARK extractor that works for any oracle family.
Insecurity of O-SNARKs for every oracle family, in the standard model. Although
the above result gives a candidate O-SNARK, it only works in the random oracle model, and it is
5 The notion is parametrized by the family O, i.e., we say Π is an O-SNARK for O.
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tailored to one construction [Mic00]. It is therefore interesting to understand whether extraction
with oracles is feasible in the standard model. And it would also be interesting to see if this is
possible based on the classical SNARK notion. Besides its theoretical interest, the latter question
has also a practical motivation since there are several efficient SNARK constructions proposed in
the last years that one might like to use in place of CS proofs. Our first result in this direction is
that assuming existence of one way functions (OWFs) there do not exist O-SNARKs for NP with
respect to every oracle family. More precisely, we show the following:
Theorem 1 (Informal). Assume OWFs exist. Then for any polynomial p(·) there is an unforge-
able signature scheme Σp such that any candidate O-SNARK, that is correct and succinct with
proofs of length bounded by p(·), cannot satisfy adaptive proof of knowledge with respect to signing
oracles corresponding to Σp.
The above result shows the existence of an oracle family for which O-SNARKs do not exist.
A basic intuition behind it is that oracles provide additional auxiliary input to adversaries and,
as formerly shown in [BCPR14, BP15], this can create issues for extraction. In fact, to obtain
our result we might also have designed an oracle that simply outputs a binary string following a
distribution with respect to which extraction is impossible due to [BCPR14, BP15]. However, in this
case the result should additionally assume the existence of indistinguishability (or differing-input)
obfuscation. In contrast, our result shows that such impossibility holds by only assuming existence
of OWFs, which is a much weaker assumption.
In addition to ruling out existence of O-SNARKs for general oracles, our theorem also rules out
their existence for a more specific class of oracle families – signing oracles – that is motivated by the
three applications mentioned earlier.6 Its main message is thus that one cannot assume existence
of O-SNARKs that work with any signature scheme. This explains why the security proofs of the
primitives considered earlier do not go through, if one wants to base it on an arbitrary signature
scheme.
Existence of O-SNARKs for specific families of signing oracles. We study ways to
circumvent our impossibility result for signing oracles of Theorem 1. Indeed, the above result can
be interpreted as saying that there exist (perhaps degenerate) signature schemes such that there
are no O-SNARKs with respect to the corresponding signing oracle family. This is not ruling out
that O-SNARKs may exist for specific signature schemes, or – even better – for specific classes of
signature schemes. We provide the following results:
1. Hash-and-sign signatures, where the hash is a random oracle, yield “safe oracles”, i.e., oracles
for which any SNARK is an O-SNARK for that oracle, in the ROM.
2. Turning to the standard model setting, we show that any classical SNARK is an O-SNARK for
signing oracles if the message space of the signature scheme is properly bounded, and O-SNARK
adversaries query “almost” the entire message space. This positive result is useful in applications
that use SNARKs with signing oracles, under the condition that adversaries make signing queries
on almost all messages.
Non-Adaptive O-SNARKs. Finally, we consider a relaxed notion of O-SNARKs in which ad-
versaries are required to declare in advance (i.e., before seeing the common reference string) all
6 We do believe that many more applications along the same line – proving knowledge of valid signatures – are
conceivable. Two recent examples which considered our work in such a setting are [DLFKP16, NT16].
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the oracle queries. For this weaker notion we show that, in the standard model, every SNARK (for
arbitrary auxiliary inputs) is a non-adaptive O-SNARK.
Applications of O-SNARKs. A nice feature of the O-SNARK notion is that it lends itself to
easy and intuitive security proofs in all those applications where one needs to execute extractors in
interactive security games with oracles. We show that by replacing SNARKs with O-SNARKs (for
appropriate oracle families) we can formally prove the security of the constructions of homomorphic
signatures, succinct functional signatures and SNARKs on authenticated data that we mentioned
in the previous section. By combining these O-SNARK-based constructions with our existence
results mentioned earlier we eventually reach conclusions about the possible secure instantiations
of these constructions. The first option is to instantiate them by using Micali’s CS proofs as an
O-SNARK: this solution essentially yields secure instantiations in the random oracle model that
work with a specific proof system [Mic00] (perhaps not the most efficient one in practice). The
second option is to instantiate them using hash-and-sign signatures, apply our result on hash-and-
sign signatures mentioned above, and then conjecture that replacing the random oracle with a
suitable hash function preserves the overall security.7 Third, one can instantiate the constructions
using a classical SNARK scheme Π and signature scheme Σ, and then conjecture that Π is also
an O-SNARK with respect to the family of signing oracles corresponding to Σ. Compared to
the first solution, the last two ones have the advantage that one could use some of the recently
proposed efficient SNARKs (e.g., [PHGR13, BSCG+13]); on the other hand, these solutions have the
drawback that security is based only on a heuristic argument. Finally, as a fourth option we provide
security proofs of these primitives under a weak, non-adaptive, notion where adversaries declare
all their queries in advance. Security in this weaker model can be proven assuming non-adaptive
O-SNARKs, and thus classical SNARKs. The advantage of this fourth option is that one obtains a
security proof for these instantiations based on clear – not newly crafted – assumptions, although
under a much weaker security notion. Finally, worth noting is that we cannot apply the positive
result on O-SNARK for signing oracles to the O-SNARK-based constructions of homomorphic
signatures, functional signatures and SNARKs on authenticated data that we provide, and thus
conclude their security under classical SNARKs. The inapplicability is due to the aforementioned
restriction of our result, for which adversaries have to query almost the entire message space.8
Interpretation of our results. In line with recent work [BCPR14, BP15] on the feasibility of
extraction in the presence of auxiliary input, our results indicate that additional care must be taken
when considering extraction in the presence of oracles. While for auxiliary input impossibility of
extraction is known under obfuscation-related assumptions, in the case of oracles we show that
extraction becomes impossible even by only assuming one-way functions. Our counterexamples are
of artificial nature and do not rule out the feasibility of extraction in the presence of “natural,
benign” oracles. Nevertheless, our impossibility results provide formal evidence of why certain
security proofs do not go through, and bring out important subtle aspects of security proofs. Given
the importance of provable security and considered the increasing popularity of SNARKs in more
practical scenarios, we believe these results give a message that is useful to protocol designers and
of interest to the community at large.
7 The need of this final heuristic step is that hash-and-sign signatures use a random oracle in verification and in our
applications the SNARK is used to prove knowledge of valid signatures, i.e., one would need a SNARK for NPO.
8 The exact reason is rather technical and requires to see the precise definitions and constructions of these primitives
first. For the familiar reader, the intuition is that in these primitives/constructions an adversary that queries almost
the entire message space of the underlying signature scheme becomes able to trivially break their security.
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1.3 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall notation and definitions used in the rest of
our work. Section 3 introduces the notion of O-SNARKs, Section 4 includes positive and negative
results about the existence of O-SNARKs, and in Section 5 we give three applications where our
new notion turns out to be useful.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote with λ ∈ N the security parameter. We say that a function ε(λ) is negligible
if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in λ. If not explicitly specified otherwise,
negligible functions are negligible with respect to λ. If S is a set, x
$← S denotes the process of
selecting x uniformly at random in S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, x $← A(·) denotes the
process of running A on some appropriate input and assigning its output to x. For binary strings
x and y, we denote by x|y their concatenation and by xi the i-th bit of x. For a positive integer n,
we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. For a random-access machine M we denote by #M(x,w) the
number of execution steps needed by M to accept on input (x,w).
The Universal Relation and NP Relations. We recall the notion of universal relation from
[BG08], here adapted to the case of non-deterministic computations.
Definition 1. The universal relation is the set RU of instance-witness pairs (y, w) = ((M,x, t), w),
where |y|, |w| ≤ t and M is a random-access machine such that M(x,w) accepts after running at
most t steps. The universal language LU is the language corresponding to RU .
For any constant c ∈ N, Rc denotes the subset of RU of pairs (y, w) = ((M,x, t), w) such that
t ≤ |x|c. Rc is a “generalized” NP relation that is decidable in some fixed time polynomial in the
size of the instance.
2.1 Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments
In this section we provide formal definitions for the notion of succinct non-interactive arguments
of knowledge (SNARKs).
Definition 2 (SNARGs). A succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) for a relation R ⊆ RU
is a triple of algorithms Π = (Gen,Prove,Ver) working as follows
Gen(1λ, T )→ crs: on input a security parameter λ ∈ N and a time bound T ∈ N, the generation al-
gorithm outputs a common reference string crs = (prs, vst) consisting of a public prover reference
string prs and a verification state vst.
Prove(prs, y, w)→ π: given a prover reference string prs, an instance y = (M,x, t) with t ≤ T and
a witness w s.t. (y, w) ∈ R, this algorithm produces a proof π.
Ver(vst, y, π)→ b: on input a verification state vst, an instance y, and a proof π, the verifier algo-
rithm outputs b = 0 (reject) or b = 1 (accept).
and satisfying completeness, succinctness, and (adaptive) soundnessas described below:
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– Completeness. For every time bound T ∈ N, every valid (y, w) ∈ R with y = (M,x, t) and
t ≤ T , there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr
[




– Succinctness. There exists a fixed polynomial p(·) independent of R such that for every large
enough security parameter λ ∈ N, every time bound T ∈ N, and every instance y = (M,x, t)
such that t ≤ T , we have
• Gen runs in time
{
p(λ+ log T ) for a fully-succinct SNARG
p(λ+ T ) for a pre-processing SNARG
• Prove runs in time
{
p(λ+ |M |+ |x|+ t+ log T ) for fully-succinct SNARG
p(λ+ |M |+ |x|+ T ) for pre-processing SNARG
• Ver runs in time p(λ+ |M |+ |x|+ log T )
• a honestly generated proof has size |π| = p(λ+ log T ).
– Adaptive Soundness. For every non-uniform A of size s(λ) = poly(λ) there is a negligible
function ε(λ) such that for every time bound T ∈ N,
Pr
[
Ver(vst, y, π) = 1 (prs, vst)←Gen(1λ, T )
∧ y 6∈ LR (y, π)←A(prs)
]
≤ ε(λ)
Furthermore, we say that Π has (s, ε)-adaptive soundness if the above condition holds for con-
crete values s and ε.
The notion of SNARG can be extended to be an argument of knowledge (a SNARK) by replacing
soundness by an appropriate proof of knowledge property.
Definition 3 (SNARKs [BCC+14]). A succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK)
for a relation R ⊆ RU is a triple of algorithms Π = (Gen,Prove,Ver) that constitutes a SNARG
(as per Definition 2) except that soundness is replaced by the following property:
– Adaptive Proof of Knowledge. For every non-uniform prover A of size s(λ) = poly(λ) there
exists a non-uniform extractor EA of size t(λ) = poly(λ) and a negligible function ε(λ) such that
for every auxiliary input aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), and every time bound T ∈ N,
Pr
Ver(vst, y, π) = 1 (prs, vst)←Gen(1λ, T )∧ (y, π)←A(prs, aux )
(y, w) 6∈ R w←EA(prs, aux )
 ≤ ε(λ)
Furthermore, we say that Π satisfies (s, t, ε)-adaptive proof of knowledge if the above condition
holds for concrete values (s, t, ε).
Remark 1 (Publicly verifiable vs. designated verifier). If security (adaptive PoK) holds against ad-
versaries that have also access to the verification state vst (i.e., A receives the whole crs) then
the SNARK is called publicly verifiable, otherwise it is designated verifier. For simplicity, in the
remainder of this work all definitions are given for the publicly verifiable setting; the corresponding
designated-verifier variants are easily obtained by giving to the adversary only the prover state prs.
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Remark 2 (About extraction and auxiliary input). First, we stress that in the PoK property the
extractor EA takes exactly the same input of A, including its random tape. Second, the PoK
definition can also be relaxed to hold with respect to auxiliary inputs from specific distributions
(instead of arbitrary ones). Namely, let Z be a probabilistic algorithm (called the auxiliary input
generator) that outputs a string aux , and let compactly denote this process as aux←Z. Then we
say that adaptive proof of knowledge holds for Z if the above definition holds for auxiliary inputs
sampled according to Z – aux←Z – where Z is also a non-uniform polynomial-size algorithm. More
formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 4 (Z-auxiliary input SNARKs). Π is called a Z-auxiliary input SNARK if Π is a
SNARK as in Definition 3 except that adaptive proof of knowledge holds for auxiliary input aux←Z.
For ease of exposition, in our proofs we compactly denote by AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z) the adaptive
proof of knowledge experiment executed with adversary A, extractor EA and auxiliary input gen-
erator Z, and that outputs 1 if Ver(vst, y, π) = 1 and (y, w) /∈ R. See below its description:
AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z)
aux←Z(1λ); crs←Gen(1λ, T )
(y, π)←A(crs, aux )
w←EA(crs, aux )
if Ver(crs, y, π) = 1 ∧ (y, w) 6∈ R return 1
else return 0
We say that Π satisfies adaptive proof of knowledge for Z-auxiliary input if for every non-uniform
A of size s(λ) = poly(λ) there is a non-uniform extractor of size t(λ) = poly(λ) and a negligible
function ε(λ) such that for every time bound T we have
Pr[AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z)⇒ 1] ≤ ε.
Furthermore, Π has (s, t, ε)-adaptive proof of knowledge for Z-auxiliary input if the above condition
holds for concrete (s, t, ε).
SNARKs for NP. A SNARK for the universal relation RU is called a universal SNARK. SNARKs
for NP are instead SNARKs in which the verification algorithm Ver takes as additional input a
constant c > 0, and adaptive proof of knowledge is restricted to hold only for relations Rc ⊂ RU .
More formally,
Definition 5 (SNARKs for NP). A SNARK for NP is a tuple of algorithms Π = (Gen,Prove,Ver)
satisfying Definition 3 except that the adaptive proof of knowledge property is replaced by the fol-
lowing one:
– Adaptive Proof of Knowledge for NP. For every non-uniform polynomial-size prover A
there exists a non-uniform polynomial-size extractor EA such that for every large enough λ ∈ N,
every auxiliary input aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), and every time bound T ∈ N, and every constant c > 0,
Pr
Verc(vst, y, π) = 1 crs←Gen(1λ, T )∧ (y, π)←A(crs, aux )
(y, w) 6∈ Rc w←EA(crs, aux )
 ≤ negl(λ)
In the case of fully-succinct SNARKs for NP, it is not necessary to provide a time bound as one
can set T = λlog λ. In this case we can write Gen(1λ) as a shorthand for Gen(1λ, λlog λ).
Zero-Knowledge SNARKs. Here we recall the zero-knowledge definition for SNARKs.
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Definition 6 (zk-SNARKs). Π = (Gen,Prove,Ver) is a (statistical) zero-knowledge SNARK for
a relation R ⊆ RU if Π is a SNARK and, moreover, satisfies the following property:
Zero-knowledge. There exists a stateful interactive polynomial-size simulator S = (Scrs, SProve)
such that for all stateful interactive distinguishers D, for every large enough security parameter
λ ∈ N, every auxiliary input aux ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), and every time bound T ∈ N,
Pr
 (y, w) ∈ R (prs, vst)←Gen(1λ, T )∧ (y, w)←D(prs, vst, aux )
D(π) = 1 π←Prove(prs, y, w)
−Pr
 (y, w) ∈ R (prs, vst, tr)←Scrs(1λ, T )∧ (y, w)←D(prs, vst, aux )
D(π) = 1 π←SProve(prs, tr, y, aux )
 ≤ negl(λ)
3 SNARKs in the presence of oracles
In this section we formalize the notion of extraction in the presence of oracles for SNARKs. We
do this by proposing a suitable adaptive proof of knowledge definition, and we call a SNARK
satisfying this definition a SNARK in the presence of oracles (O-SNARK, for short). As we shall
see, the advantage of O-SNARKs is that this notion lends itself to easy and intuitive security proofs
in all those applications where one needs to execute extractors in interactive security games with
oracles (with a secret state). Below we provide the definition while the existence of O-SNARKs is
discussed in Section 4.
3.1 O-SNARKs: SNARKs in the presence of oracles
Let O = {O} be a family of oracles. We denote by O←O the process of sampling an oracle O from
the family O according to some (possibly probabilistic) process. For example, O can be a random
oracle family, i.e., O = {O : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}L} for all possible functions from `-bits strings to
L-bits strings, in which case O←O consists of choosing a function O uniformly at random in O.
As another example, O might be the signing oracle corresponding to a signature scheme, in which
case the process O←O consists of sampling a secret key of the signature scheme according to the
key generation algorithm (and possibly a random tape for signature generation in case the signing
algorithm is randomized).
For any oracle family O, we define an O-SNARK Π for O as follows.
Definition 7 (Z-auxiliary input O-SNARKs for O). We say that Π is a Z-auxiliary input
O-SNARK for the oracle family O, if Π satisfies the properties of completeness and succinctness
as in Definition 3, and the following property of adaptive proof of knowledge for O:
– Adaptive Proof of Knowledge for O. Consider the following experiment for security pa-
rameter λ ∈ N, time bound T ∈ N, adversary A, extractor EA, auxiliary input generator Z and
oracle family O:
O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z,O)
aux←Z(1λ); O←O; crs←Gen(1λ, T )
(y, π)←AO(crs, aux )
w←EA(crs, aux , qt)
if Ver(crs, y, π) = 1 ∧ (y, w) 6∈ R return 1
else return 0
where qt = {qi,O(qi)} is the transcript of all oracle queries and answers made and received by
A during its execution.
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Π satisfies adaptive proof of knowledge with respect to oracle family O and auxiliary input
from Z if for every non-uniform oracle prover AO of size s(λ) = poly(λ) making at most
Q(λ) = poly(λ) queries there exists a non-uniform extractor EA of size t(λ) = poly(λ) and a
negligible function ε(λ) such that for every time bound T ,
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z,O)⇒ 1] ≤ ε(λ)
Furthermore, we say that Π satisfies (s, t,Q, ε)-adaptive proof of knowledge with respect to oracle
family O and auxiliary input from Z if the above condition holds for concrete values (s, t,Q, ε).
3.2 Non-Adaptive O-SNARKs
In this section we define a relaxation of O-SNARKs in which the adversary is non-adaptive in
making its queries to the oracle. Namely, we consider adversaries that first declare all their oracle
queries q1, . . . , qQ and then run on input the common reference string as well as the queries’ outputs
O(q1), . . . ,O(qQ). More formally,
Definition 8 (Z-auxiliary input non-adaptive O-SNARKs for O). We say that Π is a
Z-auxiliary input non-adaptive O-SNARK for the oracle family O, if Π satisfies the properties
of completeness and succinctness as in Definition 3, and the following property of non-adaptive
queries proof of knowledge for O:
– Non-Adaptive Proof of Knowledge for O. Consider the following experiment for security
parameter λ ∈ N, time bound T ∈ N, adversary A = (A1,A2), extractor EA, auxiliary input
generator Z and oracle family O:
O-NonAdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z,O)
(q1, . . . , qQ, st)←A1(1λ)
aux←Z(1λ); O←O; crs←Gen(1λ, T )
qt = (q1,O(q1), . . . , qQ,O(qQ))
(y, π)←A2(st, crs, aux , qt)
w←EA(crs, aux , qt)
if Ver(crs, y, π) = 1 ∧ (y, w) 6∈ R return 1
else return 0
where st is simply a state information shared between A1 and A2.
Π satisfies non-adaptive proof of knowledge with respect to oracle family O and auxiliary input
from Z if for every non-uniform prover A = (A1,A2) of size s(λ) = poly(λ) making at most
Q(λ) = poly(λ) non-adaptive queries there exists a non-uniform extractor EA of size t(λ) =
poly(λ) and a negligible function ε(λ) such that for every time bound T ,
Pr[O-NonAdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Z,O)⇒ 1] ≤ ε(λ)
Furthermore, we say that Π satisfies (s, t,Q, ε)-non-adaptive proof of knowledge with respect
to oracle family O and auxiliary input from Z if the above condition holds for concrete values
(s, t,Q, ε).
It is also possible to define a stronger variant of the above definition in which A1 is given (adaptive)
oracle access to O, whereas A2 has no access to O, except for the query transcript obtained by A1.
It is not hard to see that the result given in the following paragraph works under this intermediate
definition as well.
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Existence of Non-Adaptive O-SNARKs from SNARKs. Below we prove a simple result
showing that non-adaptive O-SNARKs follow directly from classical SNARKs for which the proof
of knowledge property holds for arbitrary auxiliary input distributions.
The idea of the proof is that the second stage adversary A2 of non-adaptive O-SNARKs is
very much like a classical SNARK adversary that makes no queries and receives a certain auxiliary
input which contains the set of oracle queries chosen by A1 with corresponding answers. The fact
that the auxiliary input includes the set of queries chosen by A1, which is an arbitrary adversary,
implies that the SNARK must support arbitrary, not necessarily benign, auxiliary inputs (i.e., it is
not sufficient to fix an auxiliary input distribution that depends only on the oracle family O).
Theorem 2. Let O be any oracle family. If Π is a SNARK satisfying (s, t, ε)-adaptive PoK (for
arbitrary auxiliary input), then Π is a non-adaptive O-SNARK for O satisfying (s, t,Q, ε)-non-
adaptive PoK.
Proof. Given the first stage adversary A1, and the oracle family O we define the following auxiliary
input distribution:
ZA1,O(1λ)
({q1, . . . , qQ}, st)←A1(1λ)
O $← O
return 〈st, {qi,O(qi)}Qi=1〉
Then, for any (A1,A2) we can build the following SNARK adversary B taking z←ZA1,O:
B(crs, z)
Parse z = 〈st, q1, y1, . . . , qQ, yQ〉
Run A2(st, crs, qt = (q1, y1, . . . , qQ, yQ))→ (y, π)
Return the same (y, π) returned by A2.
Since Π is by assumption a SNARK, for B there exists an extractor EB such that, for any auxiliary
input (and in particular for auxiliary input from ZA1,O), it holds
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,B, EB,ZA1,O)⇒ 1] ≤ ε(λ)
Finally, we simply define EA = EB. Since B’s simulation of A2 is perfect, it is easy to see that for
any A = (A1,A2) this extractor EA is such that
Pr[O-NonAdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,O)⇒ 1] ≤ ε(λ)
ut
4 On the existence of O-SNARKs
In this section we study whether O-SNARKs exist and under what assumptions. In the following
sections we give both positive and negative answers to this question.
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4.1 O-SNARKs in the random oracle model from Micali’s CS proofs
In this section we briefly discuss how the construction of CS proofs of Micali [Mic00] can be seen
as an O-SNARK for any oracle family, albeit in the random oracle model. To see this, we rely on
the result of Valiant [Val08] who shows that Micali’s construction is a “CS proof of knowledge” in
the random oracle model. The main observation is in fact that Valiant’s proof works by showing a
black-box extractor working for any prover.
Proposition 1. Let O be any oracle family and RO be a family of random oracles. Let ΠMic be
the CS proof construction from [Mic00]. Then ΠMic is an O-SNARK for (RO,O), in the random
oracle model.
Proof (Sketch). Let ERO be Valiant’s black-box extractor9 which takes as input the code of the
prover and outputs a witness w. For any adversary ARO,O we can define its extractor EA as the one
that, on input the query transcript qt of A, executes w ← ERO(A) by simulating all the random
oracle queries of ERO using qt, and finally outputs the same w. The reason why qt suffices to EA for
simulating random oracle queries to ERO is that Valiant’s extractor ERO makes exactly the same
queries of the prover.
4.2 Impossibility of O-SNARKs for every family of oracles, in the standard model
In this section we show that, in the standard model, there do not exist O-SNARKs with respect to
every family of oracles. We show this under the assumption that universal one-way hash functions
(and thus one-way functions [Rom90]) exist. To show the impossibility, we describe an oracle family
in the presence of which any candidate O-SNARK that is correct and succinct cannot satisfy
adaptive proof of knowledge with respect to that oracle family. Our impossibility result is shown
for designated-verifier O-SNARKs, and thus implies impossibility for publicly verifiable ones as well
(since every publicly verifiable O-SNARK is also designated-verifier secure). More specifically, we
show the impossibility by means of a signing oracle family. Namely, we show a secure signature
scheme Σp such that every correct and succinct O-SNARK Π cannot satisfy adaptive proof of
knowledge in the presence of the signing oracle corresponding to Σp. Interestingly, such a result
not only shows that extraction cannot work for general families of oracles, but also for families of
signing oracles, a class which is relevant to several applications.
For every signature scheme Σ = (kg, sign, vfy) we let OΣ be the family of oracles O(m) =
sign(sk,m), where every family member O is described by a secret key sk of the signature scheme,
i.e., the process O ← OΣ corresponds to obtaining sk through a run of (sk, vk)
$← kg(1λ). For the
sake of simplicity, we also assume that the oracle allows for a special query, say O(‘vk′),10 whose
answer is the verification key vk.
Theorem 3. Assume that one-way functions exist. Then for every polynomial p(·) there exists a
UF-CMA-secure signature scheme Σp such that every candidate designated-verifier O-SNARK Π
for NP, that is correct and succinct with proofs of length bounded by p(·), does not satisfy adaptive
proof of knowledge with respect to OΣp.
9 The CS proofs of knowledge definition used by Valiant considers adversaries that are non-adaptive in choosing the
statement. However it easy to see that the construction and the proof work also for the adaptive case.
10 Here vk is an arbitrary choice; any symbol not in M would do so. Introducing the extra query simplifies the
presentation, otherwise vk should be treated as an auxiliary input from a distribution generated together with the
oracle sampling.
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An intuition of the result. Before delving into the details of the proof, we provide the main
intuition of this result. This intuition does not use signature schemes but includes the main ideas
that will be used in the signature counterexample. Given a UOWHF function family H, consider the
NP binary relation R̃H = {((h, x), w) : h ∈ H, h(w) = x}, let Π be a SNARK for NP and consider
p(·) the polynomial for which Π is succinct. The idea is to show an oracle family Õ and an adversary
Ā for which there is no extractor unless H is not a universal one-way family. For every polynomial
p(·), the oracle family contains oracles Op that given a query q, interpret q as the description of
a program P(·, ·), samples a random member of the hash family h $← H, a random w, computes
x = h(w), and outputs (h, x) along with π ← P((h, x), w). If P(·, ·) = Prove(prs, ·, ·), then the
oracle is simply returning an hash image with a proof of knowledge of its (random) preimage. The
adversary ĀOp is the one that on input prs, simply asks one query q = P(·, ·) = Prove(prs, ·, ·), gets
((h, x), π)←Op(q) and outputs ((h, x), π). Now, the crucial point that entails the non-existence of
an extractor is that, provided that the input w is sufficiently longer than π, every valid extractor for
such Ā that outputs a valid w′ immediately implies a collision (w,w′) for h.11 Finally, to prevent
adversarially chosen P from revealing too much information, we require the oracle to check the
length of π, and the latter is returned only if |π| ≤ p(λ).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). The proof consists of two main steps. First, we describe the con-
struction of the signature scheme Σp based on any other UF-CMA-secure signature scheme Σ̂ with
message space M = {0, 1}∗ (that exists assuming OWFs [Lam79, Rom90]), and show that Σp is
UF-CMA-secure. Σp uses also an UOWHF family H. Second, we show that, when considering the
oracle family OΣp corresponding to the signature scheme Σp, a correct Π with succinctness p(·)
cannot be an O-SNARK for OΣp , i.e., we show an efficient O-SNARK adversary AOp (with access
to a Σp signing oracle O(·) = sign(sk, ·)), for which there is no extractor unless H is not one-way.
The counterexample signature scheme Σp. Let Σ̂ be any UF-CMA-secure scheme with message
space M = {0, 1}∗. Let H = {H}λ be a collection of function families H = {h : {0, 1}L(λ) →
{0, 1}`(λ)} where each H is an universal one-way hash family with L(λ) ≥ p(λ) + `(λ) + λ. Let
MH((h, x), w) be the machine that on input ((h, x), w) accepts iff h(w) = x, and RH be the NP
relation consisting of all pairs (y, w) such that, for y = (MH, (h, x), t), MH((h, x), w) accepts in at
most t steps.
The scheme Σp has message space M = {0, 1}∗; its algorithms work as follows:
kg(1λ): Run (v̂k, ŝk)← Σ̂.kg(1λ), set vk = v̂k, sk = ŝk.
sign(sk,m): Signing works as follows
– generate σ̂←Σ̂.sign(ŝk,m);
– sample h
$← H and w $← {0, 1}L(λ);
– compute x = h(w), t = #MH((h, x), w), and set y = (MH, (h, x), t);
– interpret m as the description of program P(·, ·) and thus run π←P(y, w);
– if |π| ≤ p(λ), set π′ = π, else set π′ = 0;
– output σ = (σ̂, h, x, π′).
vfy(vk,m, σ): Parse σ = (σ̂, h, x, π′) and return the output of Σ̂.vfy(v̂k,m, σ̂).
It is trivial to check that, as long as Σ̂ is a UF-CMA-secure scheme, Σp is also UF-CMA-secure.
Moreover, remark that the scheme Σp does not depend on the specific O-SNARK construction Π
but only on the universal polynomial p(·) bounding its succinctness.
11 This relies on the fact that sufficiently many bits of w remain unpredictable, even given π.
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Impossibility of O-SNARKs for OΣp. To show that Π is not an O-SNARK for OΣp (under
the assumption that H is universally one-way), we prove that there is an adversary AOp such that
every candidate extractor E fails in the adaptive proof of knowledge game.
Lemma 1. If H is universally one way then every Π for NP that is correct and succinct with
proofs of length p(·) is not a designated-verifier O-SNARK for OΣp.
Proof. Let AOp be the following adversary: on input prs, encode the Prove algorithm of Π with
hardcoded prs as a program P(·, ·) := Prove(prs, ·, ·); let q be P’s description, and make a single query
σ = (σ̂, h, x, π′)← O(q); return (y, π′) where y = (MH, (h, x), t) is appropriately reconstructed. We
show that for every polynomial-size extractor E it holds
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ,Ap, E ,OΣp)⇒ 0] ≤ νH(λ) + 2−λ
where νH(λ) = Adv
UOWHF
B,H (λ) is the advantage of any adversary B against H’s universal one-
wayness. This means that there is no extractor unless H is not an universal one-way family.
We proceed by contradiction assuming the existence of a polynomial-size extractor E such that
the above probability is greater than some non-negligible ε. We show how to build an adversary B
that breaks universal one-wayness of H with non-negligible probability.
B first chooses an hash input w $← {0, 1}L(λ), and then receives an instance h of H. Next, B
generates (prs, vst)←Gen(1λ) and (v̂k, ŝk) ← Σ̂.kg(1λ), and runs AOp (prs) simulating the oracle O
on the single query q := P(·, ·) = Prove(crs, ·, ·) asked by Ap. In particular, to answer the query B
uses the secret key ŝk to generate σ̂, and computes x = h(w) using the function h received from
its challenger, and the input w chosen earlier. Notice that such a simulation can be done perfectly
in a straightforward way, and that Ap’s output is the pair (y, π) created by B. Next, B runs the
extractor w′←E(prs, qt = (P(·, ·), (σ̂, h, x, π)), and outputs w′.
By correctness of Π it holds that the pair (y, π) returned by Ap satisfies Ver(vst, y, π) = 1. Thus,
by our contradiction assumption, with probability ≥ ε(λ), E outputs w′ such that (y, w′) ∈ RH.
Namely, h(w′) = x = h(w). To show that this is a collision, we argue that, information-theoretically,
w′ 6= w with probability ≥ 1−1/2λ. This follows from the fact that w is randomly chosen of length
L(λ) ≥ p(λ) + `(λ) + λ and the only information about w which is leaked to E is through π and
x = h(w), an information of length at most p(λ) + `(λ). Therefore there are at least λ bits of
entropy in w, from which Pr[w′ = w] ≤ 2−λ over the random choice of w. Hence, B can break the
universal one-wayness of H with probability ≥ ε(λ)− 2−λ. ut
4.3 O-SNARKs for signing oracles from SNARKs in the random oracle model
In this section we show that it is possible to “immunize” any signature scheme in such a way that
any classical SNARK is also an O-SNARK for the signing oracle corresponding to the transformed
scheme. The idea is very simple and consists into applying the hash-then-sign approach using a
hash function that will be modeled as a random oracle. A limitation of this result is that, since
the verification algorithm uses a random oracle, in all those applications where the SNARK is used
to prove knowledge of valid signatures, one would need a SNARK for NPO. Hence, the best one
can do is to conjecture that this still works when replacing the random oracle with a suitable hash
function.
Let us now state formally our result. To this end, for any signature scheme Σ and polynomial




let Q = Q(λ)
(sk, vk)←kg(1λ)
M̃ $← MsgSample(M, Q)
let M̃ = {m1, . . . ,mQ}
for i = 1 to Q do :
σi←sign(sk,mi)
return 〈vk, {mi, σi}Qi=1〉
where MsgSample(M, Q) is an algorithm that returns Q distinct messages, each randomly chosen
from M.
Theorem 4. Let Σ be a UF-CMA-secure signature scheme, and H be a family of hash functions
modeled as a random oracle. Let Un be the uniform distribution over strings of length n, and
ZQ,Σ be the distribution defined above, where Q is any polynomial in the security parameter. Then
there exists a signature scheme ΣH such that every (Z,U ,ZΣ,Q)-auxiliary input SNARK Π is a
Z-auxiliary input O-SNARK for (OH,OΣH) where OH is a random oracle.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. First we define the signature scheme ΣH and prove its
security from Σ. Next, we show that Π is an O-SNARK for (OH,OΣH).
The Signature Scheme ΣH. The signature scheme ΣH is essentially an application of the hash-
then-sign paradigm to scheme Σ. The only difference is that, instead of hashing only messages, we
also hash a short random string of λ bits.
Let Σ = (Σ.kg, Σ.sign, Σ.vfy) be a signature scheme with message space M = {0, 1}L, and let
H{H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}L} be a family of hash functions modeled as a random oracle. The signature
scheme ΣH = (ΣH.kg, ΣH.sign, ΣH.vfy) works as follows:
ΣH.kg(1
λ): Run (sk, vk)←Σ.kg(1λ). Output (sk, vk).
ΣH.sign(sk,m): Sample s
$← {0, 1}λ, compute h←H(s|m), σ̂←Σ.sign(sk, h), and output σ = (s, σ̂).
ΣH.vfy(vk,m, σ): Parse σ = (s, σ̂), compute h←H(s|m), return the same output of Σ.vfy(vk, h, σ̂).
Lemma 2. If Σ is an UF-CMA-secure signature scheme, so is ΣH in the random oracle model.
The security proof of the lemma is straightforward and is omitted.
Π is an O-SNARK for (OH,OΣH). We are going to prove12 that for every non-uniform
polynomial-size oracle adversary A there exists a non-uniform polynomial-size extractor EA and a
negligible function ε(λ) such that for every time bound T ,
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA, (OH,OΣH))⇒ 1] ≤ ε(λ)
As a first step, we show that for every non-uniform polynomial-size algorithm A, making
q queries to OH and Q queries to OΣH (where both q,Q = poly(λ)), there is a non-uniform,
polynomial-size, non-interactive algorithm B.
B takes as input (crs, o, z), where o←Uq·L+Q·λ, z←ZQ,Σ , and these are parsed as follows: o =
〈r′1, . . . , r′q, s1, . . . , sQ〉 with r′j ∈ {0, 1}L and si ∈ {0, 1}λ, z = 〈vk, r1, σ̂1, . . . , rQ, σ̂Q〉.




Run AOH,OΣH (crs)→ (y, π) and simulate queries to OH and OΣH as follows:
Query OH(xj), j ∈ {1, . . . , q}:
Answer with OH(xj) = r′j using r′j from o
Query OΣH(mi), i ∈ {1, . . . , Q}:
If OH(si|mi) has been already answered before, abort.
Else, set OH(si|mi) = ri, and answer OΣH(mi) = (si, σ̂i),
where ri, σ̂i are taken from z and si from o.
Return the same (y, π) returned by A.
The simulation provided by B to A is perfect unless B aborts during a signing query. This event
– let us formally call it Abort – happens if there exist i ∈ [Q] and j ∈ [q] such that xj = si|mi.
However, over the random choice of si
$← {0, 1}λ in the i-th query (indeed si was never used before








Hence, if A succeeds in producing an instance-proof pair (y, π), so does B with overwhelming
probability.
Then, by the adaptive PoK property we have that for every such B there is an extractor EB
such that for every polynomial n,Q
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,B, EB, (Un,ZQ,Σ))⇒ 1] ≤ ε(λ)
for a negligible ε.
So far, we have that for every A there is an extractor EB. In what follows, we use this EB to
define the extractor EA. The extractor EA takes as input crs and the transcript
qt = 〈x1, r′1, . . . , xq, r′q, r1, . . . , rQ,m1, s1, σ̂1, . . . ,mQ, sQ, σ̂Q〉
of queries made by A, and proceeds as follows:
EA(crs, qt)
Run w←EB(crs, o, z)
Return the same w returned by EB
Basically, it rearranges the data in qt to fulfill the format of (o, z) from distributions UqL+Qλ,ZQ,Σ .
It is not hard to see that from the above construction we have
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA, (OH,OΣH))⇒ 1] ≤ Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,B, EB, (Un,ZQ,Σ))⇒ 1] +
qQ
2λ




4.4 O-SNARKs for signing oracles from SNARKs
In this section we give a positive result showing that any SNARK Π is an O-SNARK for the signing
oracle of signature scheme Σ if: (i) the message space of Σ is appropriately bounded (to be polyno-
mially or at most superpolynomially large); (ii) Π tolerates auxiliary input consisting of the public
key of Σ plus a collection of signatures on randomly chosen messages; (iii) one considers O-SNARK
adversaries that query the signing oracle on almost the entire message space. Furthermore, in case
of superpolynomially large message spaces, one needs to assume sub-exponential hardness for Π.
The intuition behind this result is to simulate the O-SNARK adversary by using a (non-
interactive) SNARK adversary that receives the public key and a set of signatures on (suitably
chosen) messages as its auxiliary input. If these messages exactly match13 those queried by the
O-SNARK adversary, the simulation is perfect. However, since the probability of matching exactly
all the Q = poly(λ) queries may decrease exponentially in Q (making the simulation meaningless),
we show how to put proper bounds so that the simulation can succeed with probability depending
only on the message space size.
More formally, our result is stated as follows. Let Σ be a signature scheme with message space
M, and let Q := Q(·) be a function of the security parameter. Let ZQ,Σ be the following auxiliary
input distribution
ZQ,Σ(1λ)
let Q = Q(λ)
(sk, vk)←kg(1λ)
M̃ $← MsgSample(M, Q)
let M̃ = {m1, . . . ,mQ}
for i = 1 to Q do :
σi←sign(sk,mi)
return 〈vk, {mi, σi}Qi=1〉
where MsgSample(M, Q) is a probabilistic algorithm that returns a subset M̃ ⊆ M of cardinality
Q chosen according to some strategy that we discuss later. At this point we only assume a generic
strategy such that δ(|M|, Q) = Pr[MsgSample(M, Q) =M∗] for any M∗ ⊆M of cardinality Q.
Theorem 5. Let Σ be a signature scheme with message spaceM, let OΣ be the associated family of
signing oracles, and let ZQ,Σ be as defined above. If Π is a ZQ,Σ-auxiliary input SNARK satisfying
(s, t, ε)-adaptive PoK, then Π is an O-SNARK for OΣ satisfying (s′, t′, Q, ε′)-adaptive PoK, where
ε′ = ε/δ(|M|, Q), s′ = s−O(Q · log |M|), and t′ = t.
Proof. The basic idea for the proof is to show that for any O-SNARK adversary A against Π there
is a non-interactive SNARK adversary BA against Π that can perfectly simulate A, provided that
the auxiliary input from ZQ,Σ “matches” the queries made by A. More precisely, for any adversary
AO making Q oracle queries we define the following adversary BA:
BA(crs, aux = 〈vk, {m1, σi}Qi=1〉)
Run (y, π)←AO(crs) and simulate every query O(m) as follows:
let M̃ = {m1, . . . ,mQ}
13 We note that the proof requires an exact match and it is not sufficient that the O-SNARK adversary’s queries are
a subset of the sampled messages. A more precise explanation of this fact is given at the end of the proof.
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if m = 0 return vk
else if m = mi ∈ M̃ return σi
else return ⊥
return (y, π)
As one can see, the adversary BA fits the syntax of a SNARK adversary in the adaptive proof
of knowledge property, by which (if Π is a SNARK) there exists an extractor EBA such that for
every time bound T and every Q
Pr [AdPoK(λ, T,BA, EBA ,ZQ,Σ)⇒ 1] ≤ ε
For every A we define the extractor EA = EBA , and our goal is to bound
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Osign)⇒ 1] ≤ ε′
To prove this we proceed by contradiction. Namely, let us assume that there is A (and thus corre-
sponding EA = EBA) such that:
Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Osign)⇒ 1] ≥ ε′
We define G1 to be the following variation of experiment O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Osign): it gener-
ates aux ′←ZQ,Σ (using the same keypair generated when sampling oracle O←Osign), and at the
end G1 outputs 1 if qt = aux
′ holds in addition to Ver(vst, y, π) = 1 ∧ (y, w) /∈ R. Let QueryMatch
be the event that in G1 it occurs qt = aux
′. Clearly, Pr[QueryMatch] = δ(Q, |M|), and thus
Pr[G1⇒ 1] = Pr[QueryMatch] · Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, T,A, EA,Osign)⇒ 1]
≥ δ(Q, |M|) · ε′ = ε
To conclude the proof, and reach the contradiction, we show below that
Pr[AdPoK(λ, T,BA, EBA ,ZQ,Σ)⇒ 1] ≥ Pr[G1⇒ 1]
To see this, consider experiment AdPoK(λ, T,BA, EBA ,ZQ,Σ) and let QueryMatch′ be the event
that, inside the execution of BA, all the messages queried by A coincide with those in aux . Since
EA = EBA one can see that experiment G1 is basically identical to AdPoK(λ, T,BA, EBA ,ZQ,Σ)⇒1∧
QueryMatch′. Namely,
Pr[AdPoK(λ, T,BA, EBA ,ZQ,Σ)⇒ 1] ≥ Pr[AdPoK(λ, T,BA, EBA ,ZQ,Σ)⇒ 1 ∧ QueryMatch
′]
= Pr[G1⇒ 1] ≥ ε
which concludes the proof. ut
As a final remark, the reason why we need messages in M̃ to exactly match the queries of A
is that we construct A’s extractor from BA’s extractor – EA = EBA . Hence, in order for EA to call
EBA , it needs to know all its inputs, which is not the case if B has a superset of the signed messages
known to A.
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Implications of Theorem 5. The statement of Theorem 5 is parametrized by values |M|, Q
and the function δ(|M|, Q), which in turn depends on the query guessing strategy. As for the
MsgSample(M, Q) algorithm, let us consider the one that samples a random subset M̃ ⊆ M of
cardinality Q. For this algorithm we have δ(|M|, Q) = 1
(|M|Q )
.
Notice that δ(|M|, Q) is governing the success probability of our reduction, and thus we would
like this function not to become negligible. However, since Q = poly(λ) is a parameter under the
choice of the adversary, it might indeed be the case that δ(|M|, Q) ≈ 2−Q ≈ 2−λ, which would make
our reduction meaningless. To avoid this bad case, we restrict our attention to adversaries for which
Q = |M|− c for some constant c ≥ 1, i.e., adversaries that ask for signatures on the entire message
but a constant number of messages. For this choice of Q we indeed have that δ(|M|, Q) = 1|M|c
depends only on the cardinality of |M|. This gives usthe following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let Σ be a signature scheme with message space M where |M| = poly(λ) (resp.
|M| = λω(1)), and let Q = |M| − c for constant c ∈ N. If Π is a polynomially (resp. sub-
exponentially) secure ZQ,Σ-auxiliary input SNARK, then Π is an O-SNARK for OΣ (for adver-
saries making Q queries).
4.5 O-SNARKs for (pseudo)random oracles from SNARKs
In this section we show a positive result on the existence of O-SNARKs for (pseudo)random oracles,
based on classical SNARKs that are assumed to satisfy proof of knowledge with respect to randomly-
distributed auxiliary input. While we do not have a direct application of this result, we think that
it can be useful and of independent interest.
Let O = {O : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}L} be a random oracle family, i.e., a family where sampling a
member O ← O consists of sampling a suitably long random tape (of size 2` · L). Let us stress
that here, when we refer to a random oracle family, we do not necessarily consider the random
oracle model. We simply consider the case of an interactive game in which A has oracle access to
a random function.
Theorem 6. Let O be a random oracle family. Let Z be some distribution, Un be the uniform
distribution over strings of length n, and denote by (Z,U) the distribution over pairs (aux , o) such
that aux←Z and o←U . If Π is a (Zq,U)-auxiliary input SNARK for every q = poly(λ), then Π is
a Z-auxiliary input O-SNARK for O.
Proof. Completeness and succinctness follow immediately. So, we are left to prove that (adaptive)
proof of knowledge implies the corresponding property in the presence of an oracle O←O.
Formally, we have to show that for any efficient oracle prover AO there exists an efficient
extractor algorithm EA such that the joint probability that AO outputs a valid proof but EA returns
a wrong witness is negligible. At a high level, we do this proof by showing that EA’s existence is
equivalent to the existence of a SNARK extractor Ē , which is assured under the adaptive proof of
knowledge whenever AO exists.
First, for any AO we construct another adversary Ā. Precisely, let A be a non-uniform algorithm
that takes as input (crs, aux ) and (without loss of generality) makes exactly Q queries to O for
some Q = poly(λ). Then, we can define an adversary Ā that on input (crs, aux ) – where aux =
(aux , o)←(Z,UQ·L) – works as follows:
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Ā(crs, aux )
Run AO(crs, aux )→ (y, π) simulating O queries as follows:
given the i-th query O(qi), answer with the substring
O(qi) = ai = oL·(i−1)+1| · · · |oL·i
Return the same (y, π) returned by A
The simulation of O provided by Ā to A is clearly perfect. Hence, if AO succeeds in producing
an accepting instance-proof pair (y, π), so does Ā. Then, by the adaptive PoK property we have
that for every such Ā there is an extractor Ē that takes the same input of Ā and outputs a value w
such that the probability that Ā is successful in outputting an accepting pair (y, π) and the value
w returned by Ē is a wrong witness (i.e., (y, w) /∈ R) is bounded by a negligible function ε.
Basically, above we showed that for every AO there exists an extractor Ē . As a last step, we use
this Ē to show the existence of the extractor EA.
For simplicity, parse the transcript of queries qt made by AO as a pair (q,a), where q are all
the queries and a all the corresponding answers, in order. Then we define the extractor EA in the
following way.
EA(crs, aux , qt)
Run w←Ē(crs, aux ) where aux = (aux ,a)
Return the same w returned by Ē
It is easy to see that, except for some syntactic changes, EA is the same as Ē . Combining all the
above arguments, we have that for every A there is an extractor EA such that adaptive proof of
knowledge for O holds with probability ε. ut
The case of pseudorandom functions As an interesting corollary of Theorem 6 we show that
a similar result holds even for the case in which adversaries get access to a pseudorandom function
as an oracle.
Corollary 2. Let F : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}L be a family of pseudorandom functions. Let OF
be the family of oracles OF(x) = FK(x), where every family member O is described by a seed K of
the pseudorandom function, and thus the process OF←OF corresponds to sampling a random seed
K
$← {0, 1}κ. Let Z be some distribution, Un be the uniform distribution over strings of length n,
and denote by (Z,U) the distribution over pairs (aux , o) such that aux follows Z and o follows U .
If Π is a (Zq,U)-auxiliary input adaptive SNARK for every q = poly(λ), and F is pseudorandom,
then Π is a Z-auxiliary input O-SNARK for OF.
Proof. The proof of the corollary follows in two steps. The first step relies directly on Theorem 6
to see that Π is an O-SNARK for the family O of random oracles. This means that for every AO
there is an extractor EA such that adaptive proof of knowledge for O holds with probability δ.
The second step consists, informally, in replacing a random oracle with a PRF oracle and
then showing that the success probability cannot change too much, unless the function is not
pseudorandom.
For every ÃOF , we can construct another adversary AO that simply runs ÃOF , simulates all
queries using its oracle, and returns the same output of Ã. By adaptive proof of knowledge for O
there is an extractor EA. We then define the extractor EÃ = EA.
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Let us now consider the adaptive PoK experiment with ÃOF and EÃ and let δ̃ be the probability
that the final condition holds. It is easy to prove that by the pseudorandomness of F there is a
negligible function ν such that δ̃ ≤ δ + ν. ut
5 Applications of O-SNARKs
In this section we show three applications of O-SNARKs for building homomorphic signatures
[BF11], succinct functional signatures [BGI14], and SNARKs on authenticated data [BBFR15].
Generally speaking, our results show constructions of these primitives based on a signature
scheme Σ and a succinct non-interactive argument Π, and show their security by assuming that
Π is an O-SNARK for signing oracles corresponding to Σ. Once these results are established,
we can essentially reach the following conclusions about the possible secure instantiations of these
constructions. First, one can instantiate them by using Micali’s CS proofs as O-SNARK (cf. Section
4.1): this solution essentially yields secure instantiations in the random oracle model that work with
a specific proof system (perhaps not the most efficient one in practice). Second, one can instantiate
them with a classical SNARK and a hash-and-sign signature scheme (cf. Section 4.3), and conjecture
that replacing the random oracle with a suitable hash function preserves the overall security. Third,
one can instantiate the constructions using a classical SNARK construction Π and signature scheme
Σ, and then conjecture that Π is an O-SNARK with respect to the family of signing oracles
corresponding to Σ. Compared to the first solution, the last two ones have the advantage that one
could use some of the recently proposed efficient SNARK schemes (e.g., [PHGR13, BSCG+13]); on
the other hand these solutions have the drawback that the security of the instantiations would be
heavily based on a heuristic argument. Finally, a fourth option that we provide are security proofs
of these primitives which consider only non-adaptive adversaries (i.e., adversaries that declare all
their queries in advance). In this case we can prove security based on non-adaptive O-SNARKs, and
thus based on classical SNARKs (applying our Theorem 2). The advantage of this fourth option is
that one obtains a security proof for these instantiations based on classical, not new, assumptions,
although the proof holds only for a much weaker security notion.
5.1 Homomorphic Signatures
As first application of O-SNARKs we revisit a “folklore” construction of homomorphic signatures
from SNARKs. This construction has been mentioned several times in the literature (e.g., [BF11,
GW13, CF13, CFW14, GVW15]) and is considered as the ‘straightforward’ approach for construct-
ing this primitive. In this section we formalize this construction, and notice that its security proof
is quite subtle as one actually incurs the extraction issues that we mentioned in the introduction.
Namely, one needs to run an extractor in an interactive security game in the presence of a signing
oracle. Here we solve this issue by giving a simple proof based on our notion of O-SNARKs (for
families of signing oracles).
Definition of Homomorphic Signatures. We begin by recalling the definition of homomorphic
signatures. The definition below can be seen as the public key version of the notion of homomorphic
message authenticators for labeled programs of Gennaro and Wichs [GW13].
Labeled Programs [GW13]. A labeled program consists of a tuple P = (F, τ1, . . . τn) such that
F : Mn → M is a function on n variables (e.g., a circuit), and τi ∈ {0, 1}` is the label of the
i-th variable input of F . Let Fid : M → M be the canonical identity function and τ ∈ {0, 1}`
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be a label. We consider Iτ = (Fid, τ) as the identity program for input label τ . Given t labeled
programs P1, . . .Pt and a function G : Mt → M, the composed program P∗ is the one obtained
by evaluating G on the outputs of P1, . . .Pt, and is compactly denoted as P∗ = G(P1, . . .Pt). The
labeled inputs of P∗ are all distinct labeled inputs of P1, . . .Pt, i.e., all inputs with the same label
are grouped together in a single input of the new program.
Definition 9 (Homomorphic Signatures for Labeled Programs). A homomorphic signature
scheme HomSig is a tuple of probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms (HomKG,HomSign,HomVer,
HomEval) that work as follows
HomKG(1λ) takes a security parameter λ and outputs a public key VK and a secret key SK. The
public key VK defines implicitly a message spaceM, the label space L, and a set F of admissible
functions.
HomSign(SK, τ,m) takes a secret key SK, a (unique) label τ ∈ L and a message m ∈ M, and it
outputs a signature σ.
HomEval(VK, F, (σ1, . . . σn)) takes a public key VK, a function F ∈ F and a tuple of signatures
(σ1, . . . σn). It outputs a new signature σ.
HomVer(VK,P,m, σ) takes a public key VK, a labeled program P = (F, (τ1 . . . τn)) with F ∈ F , a
message m ∈M, and a signature σ. It outputs either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
and satisfy authentication correctness, evaluation correctness, succinctness, and security, as de-
scribed below.
– Authentication Correctness. Informally, we require that signatures generated by HomSign(SK,
τ,m) verify correctly for m as the output of the identity program I = (Fid, τ). Formally, HomSig
has authentication correctness if for all key pairs (SK,VK)←HomKG(1λ), any label τ ∈ L, mes-
sage m ∈M, and any signature σ←HomSign(SK, τ,m), HomVer(VK, I = (Fid, τ),m, σ) outputs
1 with all but negligible probability.
– Evaluation Correctness. Intuitively, we require that running the evaluation algorithm on sig-
natures (σ1, . . . σn), where σi is a signature for mi on label τi, produces a signature σ which veri-
fies for F (m1, . . .mn). Formally, fix a key pair (SK,VK)← HomKG(1λ,L), a function G :Mt →
M and any set of program/message/signature triples {(Pi,mi, σi)}i=1...t such that HomVer(VK,
Pi,mi, σi) = 1. If m∗ = G(m1 . . .mt), P∗ = G(P1, . . .Pt) and σ∗ = HomEval(VK, G, (σ1, . . . ,
σt)), then HomVer(VK,P∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
– Succinctness. For every large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, there is a polynomial p(·)
such that for every (SK,VK)←HomKG(1λ) the output size of HomSign and HomEval is bounded
by p(λ) for any choice of their inputs.
– Security. A homomorphic signature scheme HomSig is secure if for every PPT adversary A
there is a negligible function ε such that Pr[ExpHomSig-UFA,HomSig (λ) = 1] ≤ ε(λ) where the experiment
ExpHomSig-UFA,HomSig (λ) is described in the following:
Key generation: Run (VK,SK)←HomKG(1λ) and give VK to A.
Signing queries: A can adaptively submit queries of the form (τ,m), where τ ∈ L and m ∈M.
The challenger initializes an empty list T and proceeds as follows:
∗ If (τ,m) is the first query with label τ , then the challenger computes σ←HomSign(SK, τ,m),
returns σ to A and updates the list of queries T←T ∪ {(τ,m)}.
∗ If (τ,m) ∈ T (i.e., the adversary had already queried the tuple (τ,m)), then the challenger
replies with the same signature generated before.
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∗ If T contains a tuple (τ,m0) for some different message m0 6= m, then the challenger
ignores the query.
Note that each label τ can be queried only once.
Forgery: After the adversary is done with the queries of the previous stage, it outputs a tuple
(P∗,m∗, σ∗). Finally, the experiment outputs 1 iff the tuple returned by the adversary is a
forgery (as defined below).
Forgeries are tuples (P∗ = (F ∗, (τ∗1 , . . . τ∗n)),m∗, σ∗) such that HomVer(VK,P∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1
and they satisfy one the following conditions:
∗ Type 1 Forgery: There is i ∈ [n] such that (τ∗i , ·) /∈ T (i.e., no message m has ever been
signed w.r.t. label τ∗i during the experiment).
∗ Type 2 Forgery: All labels τ∗i have been queried—∀i ∈ [n], (τ∗i ,mi) ∈ T—but m∗ 6=
F ∗(m1, . . .mn) (i.e., m
∗ is not the correct output of the labeled program P∗ when executed
on the previously signed messages(m1, . . .mn)).
Context-Hiding. Another property which is useful for homomorphic signatures is context-hiding.
Intuitively, this property says that a signature on the output of a function does not reveal anything
about its inputs, beyond what can be trivially learned by the verifier. Here we recall a (statistical)
version of the definition proposed in [BF11] (also adapted to our syntax).
Definition 10 (Weak Context-Hiding). A homomorphic signature scheme HomSig is weakly
context hiding if there exists a PPT simulator S = (SKG, SEval) such that, for any fixed choice of
function F , tuple of messages m1, . . . ,mn ∈ M, set of labels τ1, . . . , τn ∈ L, it holds that for any
distinguisher D and large enough security parameter λ ∈ N:
Pr
 (VK,SK)←HomKG(1λ)D(VK,SK, {σi}i∈[n], σ̄) = 1 σi←HomSign(SK, τi,mi)∀i ∈ [n]
σ̄←HomEval(VK, F, (σ1, . . . σn))
−
Pr
 (VK,SK)←SKG(1λ)D(VK, SK, {σi}i∈[n], σ̄) = 1 σi←HomSign(SK, τi,mi)∀i ∈ [n]
σ̄←SEval(P, F (m1, . . . ,mn))
 ≤ negl(λ)
Note that since the definition holds for fixed F, {mi}i, {τi}i, these values can also be given to D.
The notion is called weak context-hiding in contrast to a strong notion where one can also hide the
fact that a homomorphic evaluation took place.
Homomorphic Signatures from O-SNARKs. To build the homomorphic signature we use a
regular signature scheme Σ (cf. Appendix A.1 for the definition) and a fully-succinct O-SNARK
Π for NP. The resulting scheme is homomorphic for all functions F whose running time is upper
bounded by some fixed polynomial tF (·), and the scheme is 1-hop, i.e., it is not possible to apply
HomEval on signatures obtained from other executions of HomEval.14
Defining the machine MΣ,F . Let Σ be a signature scheme, and F be the description of a
function F : X n → X where X is some appropriate domain (e.g., X = {0, 1}µ). Then MΣ,F (x,w)
14 Previous work hinted the possibility of achieving multi-hop homomorphic signatures by using SNARKs with
recursive composition. However, given the issues we already notice in using classical SNARKs, it is unclear to us
whether such a multi-hop construction would allow for a proof.
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is the random-access machine that works as follows. It takes inputs (x,w) where values x are of
the form x = (vk,m, τ1, . . . , τn) where vk is a public key of the scheme Σ, m ∈ X is a message and
τi ∈ {0, 1}` are labels, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The values w are instead tuples w = (m1, σ1, . . . ,mn, σn)
where for every i ∈ [n], mi ∈ X is a message and σi is a signature of the scheme Σ. On input such
a pair (x,w), MΣ,F (x,w) accepts iff
m = F (m1, . . . ,mn) ∧ vfy(vk, τi|mi, σi) = 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
Associated to such machine there is also a polynomial time bound tΣ,F (k) = k
eΣ,F , such that MΣ,F
rejects if it does more than tΣ,F (|x|) steps. Finally, we note that given a polynomial bound tF (k) =
keF on the running time of every F supported by the scheme, a polynomial bound tΣ(k) = k
eΣ
on the running time of Σ’s verification algorithm, and values n, µ, `, one can efficiently deduce the
constant exponent eΣ,F for the time bound tΣ,F (|x|) = |x|eΣ,F .
We call RΣ the NP binary relation consisting of all pairs (y, w) such that, parsing y =
(MΣ,F , x, t), MΣ,F (x,w) accepts in at most t steps and t ≤ tΣ,F (|x|).
The construction. Let Σ = (kg, sign, vfy) be a signature scheme and Π = (Gen,Prove,Ver) be
a fully-succinct O-SNARK for NP. The homomorphic signature scheme HomSig[Σ,Π] is defined as
follows.
HomKG(1λ): Run (sk, vk)←kg(1λ) and crs←Gen(1λ). Define SK = sk and VK = (vk, crs). Let the
message be M = {0, 1}µ and the label space be L = {0, 1}`. Output (SK,VK).
HomSign(SK, τ,m): Run σ←sign(sk, τ |m). Output σ̄ = (signature, (τ,m, σ)).
HomEval(VK,m, F, (σ̄1, . . . , σ̄n)): Parse every σ̄i = (signature, (τi,mi, σi)), compute m = F (m1,
. . . ,mn), reconstruct an instance y = (MΣ,F , x, t) where x = (vk,m, τ1, . . . , τn) and t = |x|eΣ,F ,
and the witness w = (m1, σ1, . . . ,mn, σn). Finally, run π←Prove(crs, y, w) and output σ̄ =
(proof, π).
HomVer(VK,P = (F, (τ1, . . . τn)),m, σ̄): Parse the signature σ̄ = (flag, ·) and output the bit b com-
puted as follows:
If σ̄ = (signature, (τ,m, σ)) and P = I = (Fid, τ) run vfy(vk, τ |m,σ)→ b.
If σ̄ = (proof, π) run VereΣ,F (crs, y, π)→ b where y = (MΣ,F , x = (vk,m, τ1, . . . , τn), |x|eΣ,F ).
Recall that in a SNARK for NP, Verc is given a constant c > 0 and only works for relation Rc.
In what follows we show that the scheme above is a homomorphic signature.
Authentication Correctness. For the present scheme the definition asks that signatures σ̄ =
(signature, (τ,m, σ)) as generated by HomSign(SK, τ,m) verify correctly for m as the output of
the identity program I = (Fid, τ). Observe that for all key pairs (SK,VK)←HomKG(1λ), any la-
bel τ ∈ L and any σ̄←HomSign(SK, τ,m), the algorithm HomVer(VK, I = (Fid, τ), σ̄) performs
the verification by running vfy(vk, τ |m,σ). By the correctness of the signature scheme Σ, for any
signature σ←sign(sk, τ |m), vfy(vk, τ |m,σ) outputs 1 with all but negligible probability.
Therefore authentication correctness of HomSig(Σ,Π) follows.
Evaluation Correctness. To see evaluation correctness, fix a key pair (SK,VK) ← HomKG(1λ),
and a set of triples of the form {(τi,mi, σ̄i)}i=1...n where σ̄i = (signature, (τi,mi, σi)) and for which
HomVer(VK, Ii = (Fid, τi),mi, σ̄i) = 1.
Let σ̄∗← HomEval(VK, F ∗, (σ̄1, . . . , σ̄n)), where σ̄∗ = (proof, π) with π a proof generated by Prove(prs, y, w)
by setting y = (MΣ,F , x = (vk,m
∗, τ1, . . . , τn), |x|eΣ,F ) and w = (m1, σ1, . . . ,mn, σn).
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If m∗ = F ∗(m1 . . .mn) (for an F
∗ that is in the class of supported functions) and since
HomVer(VK, Ii,mi, σ̄i) means vfy(vk, τi|mi, σi) = 1, we have that (y, w) ∈ RΣ . Thus HomVer(VK,P∗,
m∗, σ̄∗) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability by the correctness of the SNARK VereΣ,F (crs, y, π) =
1.
Succinctness. As the output of the HomEval algorithm is a proof π obtained by running the Prove
algorithm, the succinctness of HomSign(Σ,Π) follows from the succinctness of Π.
Security. As in Section 4.2, for every signature scheme Σ = (kg, sign, vfy) we denote by OΣ the
family of oracles O(m) = sign(sk,m) (where the verification key is returned as output of a special
query O(‘vk′)). We show the security of the scheme HomSig[Σ,Π] via the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let Σ be a signature scheme. If Π is an O-SNARK for OΣ, and Σ is UF-CMA-secure,
then HomSig[Σ,Π] is a secure homomorphic signature scheme.
Proof. To prove that this scheme is a secure homomorphic signature, we assume by contradiction
the existence of an efficient adversary A that is able to output a forgery of one of the two types
with non-negligible probability δ. Starting from this algorithm A, we further construct a successful
forger B against the UF-CMA-security of Σ, which leads to a contradiction. Along the way of this
reduction, we also rely on the fact that Π is an O-SNARK satisfying adaptive proof of knowledge
for OΣ .
By looking at the definition of the security experiment ExpHomSig-UFA,HomSig (λ) for the HomSig scheme,
adversary A is almost equivalent to an O-SNARK adversary ÃO for oracle O ← Osign. Stated more
formally, for every adversaryA against HomSig that outputs a forgery P∗ = (F ∗, (τ∗1 , . . . τ∗n)),m∗, σ̄∗ =
(proof, π), it is possible to construct another adversary ÃO(crs) working as follows: it queries
vk←O(‘vk′); it runs AHomSign(SK,·)(VK = (vk, crs)) simulating A’s oracle queries using its own ora-
cle O; finally it returns the value (y, π), where y = (MΣ,F ∗ , x, |x|eΣ,F ), with x = (vk,m∗, τ∗1 , . . . , τ∗n),
is obtained from A’s output. The adversary Ã perfectly fits the O-SNARK definition by which we
know that there exists an extractor EÃ that, given the same input of Ã
O and the transcript of oracle
queries/answers made and received by ÃO, outputs a correct witness w (i.e., such that (y, w) ∈ RΣ)
with all but negligible probability.
Hence, we have that for every successful adversary A against HomSig there exists extractor EÃ,
that takes the very same input of A (plus, the list of oracle answers). Starting from this adversary
A, we construct the forger BO that breaks the UF-CMA security of Σ. We build B (which gets the
public key vk and can make queries to O = sign(sk, ·) oracle) as follows:
BO(vk) :
Initialize qt←(‘vk′, vk)
Generate crs←Gen(1λ) and run A(VK = (crs, vk))
Simulate queries (τ,m) to O as follows:
query σ←O(τ |m) and add (τ |m,σ) to qt
output σ
When A outputs (P∗ = (F ∗, (τ∗1 , . . . τ∗n)),m∗, σ̄∗) parse σ̄∗ = (proof, π∗)









Check that (y, w) ∈ RΣ , i.e., that MΣ(x,w) = 1 in at most |x|eΣ,F steps
where MΣ(x,w) := (m
∗ = F (m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n) ∧ vfy(vk, τ∗i |m∗i , σ∗i ) = 1, ∀i ∈ [n])
[ Fail ] Abort if (y, w) /∈ RΣ .
Else proceed:
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[Type 1] If ∃j ∈ [n] such that (τ∗j |·, ·) /∈ qt return (τ∗j |m∗j , σ∗j )
[Type 2] If ∀i ∈ [n] there is a tuple (τ∗i |mi, σi) ∈ qt
and there ∃j ∈ [n] such that m∗j 6= mj return (τ∗j |m∗j , σ∗j )
Let us now show that wheneverA succeeds in the simulation described above, B is also successful
in breaking the UF-CMA security of Σ, unless the “Fail” event happens.
First, let us condition on the event that B does not abort, i.e., “Fail” does not occur, that is
the extractor EÃ is correct in returning a valid witness. If A outputs the first type of forgery, since
the witness w is valid— vfy(vk, τ∗i |m∗i , σ∗i ) = 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , n— it follows that the signature forgery
(τ∗j |m∗j , σ∗j ) is a valid one.
If the forgery returned by A is of the second type, recall this means that m∗ 6= F (m1, . . . ,mn)
where all inputs of F are the ones in the transcript qt, i.e., qt contains the tuples (τ∗1 |m1, σ1), . . . (τ∗n|mn, σn).
Combining this with the validity of w we have that F (m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n) = m
∗ 6= F (m1, . . . ,mn), and thus
(m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
n) 6= (m1, . . . ,mn). This means that there exists at least one j such that (τ∗j |mj , σ) ∈ qt
but m∗j 6= mj . Moreover, by witness validity it also holds vfy(vk, τ∗j |m∗j , σ∗j ) = 1. Thus we can
conclude that, even in this case, (τ∗j |m∗j , σ∗j ) is a valid forgery for Σ.
So far, we have proved that whenever the adversary A is able to output a valid forgery and
B does not abort, then B is a successful adversary against the UF-CMA security of Σ. However,
whenever A is successful (with non-negligible probability), by the O-SNARK definition we have
that “Fail” occurs with negligible probability at most ε. Therefore, if A is successful with probability
at least δ, then B is successful with non-negligible probability ≥ δ − ε. ut
Non-adaptive security. Alternatively, one can modify the previous proof to show that the scheme
has security against homomorphic signature adversaries that make non-adaptive signing queries, as-
suming the weaker assumption that Π is a non-adaptive O-SNARK (see Definition 8). In particular,
combining this change with the result of Theorem 2 one obtains the following:
Theorem 8. If Π is a SNARK, and Σ is a UF-CMA-secure signature scheme, then HomSig[Σ,Π]
is secure against adversaries that make non-adaptive signing queries.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 7 and thus we only sketch the main differences
from that proof. To work with non-adaptive adversaries the only main change is that for every non-
adaptive adversary A one can define a corresponding non-adaptive O-SNARK adversary Ã. Then
the only difference is that the non-adaptive queries of A can be used to define the non-adaptive
queries of Ã. The rest of the proof proceeds analogously.
Remark 3 (On the applicability of Corollary 1). We note that we cannot combine the positive result
of Corollary 1 with Theorem 7 to conclude that the security of the homomorphic signature scheme
holds under classical SNARKs. The inapplicability of Corollary 1 is due to its restriction for which
adversaries have to query almost the entire message space. By looking at the HomSig construction
(and the definition of homomorphic signatures too) one can note that an adversary who queries
almost the entire message space of the underlying signature scheme can trivially break the security
(for example he could obtain signatures on two distinct messages under the same label).
Insecurity of HomSig[Σ∗, Π]. Here we show the existence of a signature scheme Σ∗ for which
HomSig[Σ∗, Π] is insecure. Note that this insecurity result does not contradict our Theorem 7
as it is indeed possible to show that Σ∗ is in the class of schemes for which the existence of an
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O-SNARK is ruled out. Rather, this counterexample shows that the issue with proving the security
of the homomorphic signature construction is not a mere difficulty in doing the proof, but that the
construction can actually become insecure, if one simply relies on an arbitrary signature scheme.
Construction of Σ∗. Consider the HomSig construction in which messages are bits (i.e., µ = 1)
and labels are strings of length ` = poly(λ), such that the Prove(crs, ·, ·) algorithm of Π is at most
(` + 1)-bits long. Let Σ̂ be any UF-CMA-secure scheme with message space M = {0, 1}`+1. We
construct the signature scheme Σ∗ from Σ̂ as follows:
kg(1λ): Run (v̂k, ŝk)
$← Σ̂.kg(1λ), set vk = v̂k, sk = ŝk, and also set δ = p(λ) + λ.
sign(sk,m): Signing works as follows
– sample r
$← {0, 1}δ, and compute σ̂←Σ̂.sign(ŝk, r|m);
– sample m′
$← {0, 1}`+1, r′ $← {0, 1}δ, compute σ̂′←Σ̂.sign(ŝk, r′|m′), and set σ′ = (r′, σ̂′, 0, 0);
– parse m′ ∈ {0, 1}`+1 bit by bit as (m′1| · · · |m′`+1), set τ = m′1| · · · |m′`, x = (vk,m′`+1, τ),
w = (m′`+1, σ
′), and let I : {0, 1} → {0, 1} be the identity function;
– let t = #MΣ∗,I(x,w), and set y = (MΣ∗,I , x, t);
– Interpret m as the description of program P(·, ·) and thus run π←P(y, w);
– if |π| > p(λ) set π′ = 0 and y = 0, else π′ = π.
– output σ = (r, σ̂,m′, π′).
vfy(vk,m, σ): Parse σ = (r, σ̂,m′, π′) where r is δ-bits long, and return the output of Σ̂.vfy(v̂k, r|m, σ̂).
Before proving the security of Σ∗, we provide some intuitions about the rational of the above
construction:
– The signing algorithm consists of two main steps. First, given the message m, we sign r|m (i.e.,
we prepend the random string r to m) using Σ̂.sign. Second, we generate another signature on
a randomly chosen message m′ ∈ {0, 1}`+1. This is done following the same process as for m,
i.e., by sampling a random r′
$← {0, 1}δ and signing r′|m′ using Σ̂.sign.
– Then, we construct a theorem (y, w) for the relation RΣ∗ with respect to the identity function
I. In particular, recall the definition of MΣ∗,I(x,w) from Section 5.1: this is the machine that
on inputs x = (vk,m, τ), where vk is a public key of the scheme Σ∗, m is a bit and τ ∈ {0, 1}`
and w = (m∗, σ∗) accepts iff
m = I(m∗) ∧ vfy(vk, τ |m,σ∗) = 1
– Finally, one interprets the input message m as a program P description and runs π←P(y, w).
Its output, together with m′, is included in the signature as an extra information. As one can
see, if P(·, ·) = Prove(crs, ·, ·) then π is a valid proof. Yet, before returning π we make sure that
(regardless of its validity) π is short enough and we set the new value π′.
– The meaning of δ: The reason of adding the random string r to the signature is to increase the
entropy of the signatures generated by Σ∗. This is crucial for the signatures σ′ that are used to
generate π. Basically, we want to make sure that π cannot leak enough information about σ′.
Since the output of the program is of length p, taking r′ to be sufficiently long – of p(λ) + λ
bits – guarantees that some information about σ′ is inevitably lost.
Proof of UF-CMA-security for Σ∗. We prove that Σ∗ is secure as long as Σ̂ is secure:
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Lemma 3. If Σ̂ is UF-CMA-secure scheme, then Σ∗ is UF-CMA-secure. More precisely, for any
PPT adversary A that has advantage ε(λ) in breaking the security of Σ∗ by making Q signing
queries there is a PPT adversary Â that breaks the security of Σ̂ with advantage > ε(λ)−Q/2λ by
making 2Q queries.
Below we mention the steps for the proof of the lemma. The idea of the proof is that Â runs
(m∗, σ∗)←Asign(ŝk,·)(v̂k) and simulates every signing query m by executing sign(sk,m) except that
the executions of Σ̂.sign(ŝk, ·) are replaced by queries to Â’s signing oracle (this is why every
signing query produces two queries on Â’s side). The only tricky part of the proof is to show that
the message m∗ used in the forgery leads to a new message m̂∗ = r∗|m∗ in the game played by Â, i.e.,
that r∗|m∗ 6= ri|mi for all the ri|mi queried by Â. We argue that this is the case with overwhelming
probability, based on the random choices of all values r′ in the signing query simulation. In fact,
one should note that A never gets to see the value r′ used to generate σ′; moreover since r′ is δ-bits
long and Ap sees at most p(λ) bits of information of it, then λ bits of r′ are always lost. Therefore
the probability that r∗ = r′ is bounded by the probability that A predicts correctly r′.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists an adversary A that has non-negligible advantage
ε(λ) against the UF-CMA security of Σp while running in polynomial time and making Q queries
to the sign(sk, ·) oracle. Starting from this adversary A, we construct a PPT adversary Â that is
able to break the UF-CMA security of Σ̂ with non-negligible advantage and by making at most 2Q
queries to its signing oracle Σ̂.sign(ŝk, ·).
We define Â (which gets the public key v̂k and makes queries to Σ̂.sign(ŝk, ·) oracle) as follows:
ÂΣ̂.sign(ŝk,·)(v̂k)
Run (m∗, σ∗)←Asign(ŝk,·)(v̂k) and simulate queries m to sign(ŝk, ·) as follows:
sample r
$← {0, 1}δ, and query σ̂←Σ̂.sign(ŝk, r|m);
sample m′
$← {0, 1}`+1, r′ $← {0, 1}δ;
query σ̂′←Σ̂.sign(ŝk, r′|m′), and set σ′ = (r′, σ̂′, 0, 0);
parse m′ ∈ {0, 1}`+1 as (m′1| · · · |m′`+1);
set τ = m′1| · · · |m′`, x = (vk,m′`+1, τ), w = (m′`+1, σ′);
let t = #MΣ∗,I(x,w), and set y = (MΣ∗,I , x, t), where I is the identity;
interpret m as the description of program P(·, ·) and thus run π←P(y, w);
if |π| > p(λ) set π′ = 0 and m′ = 0, else π′ = π;
output σ = (r, σ̂,m′, π′).
Parse σ∗ = (r∗, σ̂∗, ·, ·) and return (r∗|m∗, σ̂∗)
Let us now show that whenever A succeeds in the simulation described above, Â succeeds in
breaking the UF-CMA security of the scheme Σ̂, with all but negligible probability. To this end
we have to first show that the simulation provided by Â works correctly, and then show that Â
outputs a valid forgery as long as Ap outputs a forgery.
To ease the analysis, consider the set of all queries (and corresponding responses) made by A:
Q∗ = {mi, σi = (ri, σ̂i,m′i, πi) i = 1 . . . Q}
Then the set of Â’s queries is Q̂ = Q̂∗ ∪ Q̂′ with
Q̂∗ = {(m̂i = ri|mi, σ̂i) i = 1 . . . Q}
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Q̂′ = {(m̂′j = r′j |m′j , σ̂′j) j = 1 . . . Q}
Precisely, the first set Q̂∗ consists of all signing queries asked by Â to its oracle for signing the
messages mi queried by A. The second set Q̂′ instead, comprises the extra queries asked by Â in
the simulation for signing the sampled messages m′j .
It is easy to see that Â provides a perfect simulation to A as Â can correctly answer every
query of A using its own signing oracle.
So the main fact to show is that the message m∗ used in the forgery leads to a new message m̂∗
in the game played by Â.
Let (m∗, σ∗ = (r∗, σ̂∗, ·, ·)) be a valid forgery for Σ∗ (i.e., m∗ 6= mi, for all mi ∈ Q∗), and let us
consider the following undesired cases:
1. (m̂∗ = r∗|m∗, ·) ∈ Q̂∗: Since m∗ 6= mi ∀mi ∈ Q∗ this case cannot occur even if the corresponding
strings ri and r
∗ match.
2. (m̂∗ = r∗|m∗, ·) ∈ Q̂′: It must be that m̂∗ = r∗|m∗ = r′j |m′j = m̂′j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. In
what follows we bound the probability that such equality happens and show that it is negligible.
Both r∗ and r′j are parsed as strings of the same length δ = p(λ) + λ. Hence, r
∗|m∗ = r′j |m′j
immediately implies m∗ = m′j , which may be possible since m
∗ is of adversarial choice. To bound
the probability of match we thus only look at the event that r∗ = r′j .
Now, the crucial observation is that the adversary A never sees the strings r′j explicitly, and
thus the probability of the match can be upper bounded by the probability that the adversary A
guesses correctly the string r′j ∈ {0, 1}δ where δ = p(λ) + λ.
Below we argue that this happens with negligible probability ≤ Q
2λ
. For j ∈ {1, . . . Q} let Badj
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Now, we will bound the probability of Badj for any fixed j. The value πj ← P(y, w) the adversary
A gets from the j-th query is the only one that can reveal some information about σ′j = (r′j , σ̂′j , 0, 0)
and implicitly about r′j . We show that the information gained from πj does not give any advantage
to the adversary.
Let us represent the process of running π←P(y, (m′λ, σ′j = (R, σ̂′j , 0, 0))) and returning π only if
|π| ≤ p(λ) as a function f(R) such that f : {0, 1}δ → {0, 1}p. Namely, we fix P and all its inputs
but R. Observe that, for random chosen inputs, any such f is essentially performing a lossy data
compression of δ − p(λ) = λ bits.
We have that ∀f : {0, 1}δ → {0, 1}p, the probability that any algorithm Ã guesses the random
string r′j on input f(r
′





. The same holds for A and f defined as before. Hence,









The proof is concluded by observing that




Proof of insecurity of HomSig[Σ∗, Π]. Below we show an adversary A∗ that has non-negligible
probability of winning in ExpHomSig-UFA∗,HomSig[Σ∗,Π](λ). Our adversary wins by producing a Type 1 forgery
with respect to an identity function. For ease of exposition, we give the following security experiment





(I∗ = (Fid, τ∗),m∗, σ̄∗)
$← AHomSign(SK,·)(VK)
If HomVer(VK, I∗,m∗, σ̄∗) = 1 and τ∗ is “new”, output 1
Else output 0
Lemma 4. Let Π be a SNARK, and Σ∗ be the UF-CMA-secure signature scheme defined above.
Then there exists an efficient adversary A∗ such that
Pr[ExpType-1,IdA∗,HomSig[Σ∗,Π](λ) = 1] = 1− negl(λ)
Proof. Below is the description of our adversary A∗:
Adversary A∗HomSign(SK,·)(VK)
1 Query the signing oracle on (τ,m) := P
where P is the description of Prove(crs, ·, ·)
2 Parse the answer σ = (r, σ̂,m′, π′), and m′ = (m′1| · · · |m′`+1)
3 Set τ∗ = (m′1| · · · |m′`) and m∗ = m′`+1
4 Return (I∗ = (Fid, τ∗),m∗, σ̄∗ = (proof, π′))
Note that, except with probability 2−`, it holds τ∗ 6= τ . Moreover, by the correctness of Π
(and its succinctness), the answer to A∗’s oracle query contains a valid proof π′ that verifies for
the identity function with message m∗ and label τ∗. In other words the output of A∗ constitutes a
Type-1 forgery with probability 1− 2−`. ut
Context-Hiding of HomSig.
Theorem 9. If Π is a zero-knowledge O-SNARK then HomSig is weakly context-hiding.
Proof. To show weakly context-hiding for HomSig[Σ,Π] we define a simulator SHide = (SKG, SEval).
For this purpose we use the PPT simulator SΠ = (Scrs, SProve) from the zero-knowledge of Π.
SKG(1λ) :
Run (vk, sk)←kg(1λ)
Run (prs, vst, tr)←Scrs(1λ, T )
Set SK = (sk, prs) and VK = (vk, vst)
32
Output (VK,SK)
SEval(P = (F, τ1, . . . τn)),m∗) :
Set y = (MΣ,F , x = (vk,m
∗, τ1 . . . τn), |x|eΣ,F )
Run π←SProve(prs, tr, y)
Output σ̄ = (proof, π)
For any distinguisher DHide against the weakly context-hiding of HomSign[Σ,Π], we can easily
construct a distinguisher DΠ against zero knowledge O-SNARK property:
DΠ(crs) :
Generate a pair (sk, vk)←kg(1λ)
Set SK = (sk, prs) and VK = (vk, vst)
Let F,m1, . . . ,mn, τ1 . . . τn be the fixed tuple:
Run σi←HomSign(sk, τi,mi) ∀i ∈ [n]
Output (y, w) to its challenger, and get back π
(where y = (MΣ,F , x = (vk,m
∗ = F (m1, . . . ,mn), τ1 . . . τn), |x|eΣ,F )
and w = (m1, σ1, . . . ,mn, σn))
run b←DHide(VK, SK, σ1, . . . , σn, σ̃ = (proof, π))
Output b.
Clearly, if DΠ receives π and crs generated using the real algorithms, it simulates the real game to
DHide. Otherwise, if these values are generated through the zero-knowledge simulator, then the view
of DHide is identical to the case where it receives values generated using our context hiding simulator
described above. Therefore, the distinguishing advantage of DΠ in distinguishing between a real or
a simulated proof is the same as that of the algorithm DHide in distinguish the two distributions in
the answers from the context-hiding definition.
5.2 Succinct Functional Signatures
As second application of O-SNARKs we revisit the construction of succinct functional signatures of
Boyle, Goldwasser, and Ivan [BGI14]. In [BGI14] this construction is proven secure using a notion
of SNARKs which significantly differs from the standard one [BCC+14](for completeness we recall
this notion in Appendix B).To the best of our knowledge, there are no known instantiations of
SNARKs under this definition, in the standard model (and is not clear whether it is possible to find
some). On the other hand, if one wants to prove the security of this construction using the classical
SNARK definition, the security proof incurs the same subtleties related to running an extractor in
the presence of a signing oracle.
In this section, we revisit the construction of [BGI14], and we prove its security using O-SNARKs.
Interestingly, this proof differs a little from the one of homomorphic signature as here we have to
consider O-SNARKs for multiple signing oracles.
Definition 11 (Functional Signatures [BGI14]). A functional signature scheme FS for a mes-
sage space M and function family F = {f : Df →M} is a tuple of probabilistic, polynomial-time
algorithms (FS.Setup,FS.KeyGen,FS.Sign,FS.Ver) that work as follows
FS.Setup(1λ) takes a security parameter λ and outputs a master verification key mvk and a master
secret key msk.
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FS.KeyGen(msk, f) takes the master secret key msk and a function f ∈ F (represented as a circuit)
and it outputs a signing key skf for f .
FS.Sign(mvk, f, skf ,m) takes as input a function f ∈ F , a signing key skf , and a message m ∈ Df ,
and it outputs (f(m), σ)where σ represents a signature on f(m).
FS.Ver(mvk,m∗, σ) takes as input the master verification key mvk, a message m∗ ∈ M and a
signature σ, and outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
and satisfy correctness, unforgeability, and function privacy as described below.
– Correctness. A functional signature scheme is correct if the following holds with probability 1:
∀f ∈ F , ∀m ∈ Df , (msk,mvk)← FS.Setup(1λ), skf ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f),
(m∗, σ)← FS.Sign(mvk, f, skf ,m),FS.Ver(mvk,m∗, σ) = 1
– Unforgeablity. A functional signature scheme is unforgeable if for every PPT adversary A
there is a negligible function ε such that Pr[ExpFS-UFA,FS (λ) = 1] ≤ ε(λ) where the experiment
ExpFS-UFA,FS (λ) is described in the following:
Key generation: Generate (msk,mvk)← FS.Setup(1λ), and gives mvk to A.
Queries: The adversary is allowed to adaptively query a key generation oracle Okey and a signing
oracle Osign, that share a dictionary D indexed by tuples (f, i) ∈ F × N, whose entries are
signing keys. For answering these queries, the challenger proceeds as follows:
• Okey (f, i):
∗ If (f, i) ∈ D (i.e., the adversary had already queried the tuple (f, i)), then the challenger
replies with the same key skif generated before.
∗ Otherwise, generate a new skif ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f), add the entry (f, i) → skif in D,
and return skif .
• Osign (f, i,m):
∗ If there is an entry for the key (f, i) in D, then the challenger generates a signature on
f(m) using this key, i.e., σ ← FS.Sign(mvk, f, skif ,m).
∗ Otherwise, generate a new key skif ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f), add an entry (f, i) → skif to
D, and generate a signature on f(m) using this key, i.e., σ ← FS.Sign(mvk, f, skif ,m).
Forgery: After the adversary is done with its queries, it outputs a pair (m∗, σ), and the experi-
ment outputs 1 iff the following conditions hold
∗ FS.Ver(mvk,m∗, σ) = 1.
∗ there does not exist m such that m∗ = f(m) for any f which was sent as a query to the
Okey oracle.
∗ there does not exist a pair (f,m) such that (f,m) was a query to the Osign oracle and
m∗ = f(m).
– Function privacy. Intuitively, function privacy requires that the distribution of signatures on a
message m that are generated via different keys skf should be computationally indistinguishable,
even given the secret keys and master signing key. More formally, a functional signature scheme
has function privacy if for every PPT adversary A there is a negligible function ν such that
Pr[ExpFS-FPriA,FS (λ) = 1] ≤ ν(λ) where experiment ExpFS-FPriA,FS (λ) works as follows:
• The challenger generates a key pair (mvk,msk)← FS.Setup(1λ) and gives (mvk,msk) to A.
• The adversary chooses a function f0 and receives an (honestly generated) secret key skf0 ←
FS.KeyGen(msk, f0).
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• The adversary chooses a second function f1 such that |f0| = |f1| (where padding can be used
if there is a known upper bound) and receives an (honestly generated) secret key skf1 ←
FS.KeyGen(msk, f1).
• The adversary chooses a pair of values (m0,m1) such that |m0| = |m1| and f0(m0) = f1(m1).
• The challenger selects a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes a signature on the image
message m∗ = f0(m0) = f1(m1) using secret key skfb, and gives the resulting signature
σ ← FS.Sign(skfb ,mb) to A.
• The adversary outputs a bit b′, and the experiment outputs 1 iff b′ = b.
Definition 12 (Succinct Functional Signatures). A functional signature scheme is called suc-
cinct if there exists a polynomial s(·) such that, for every security parameter λ ∈ N, f ∈ F ,
m ∈ Df , it holds with probability 1 over (mvk,msk) ← FS.Setup(1λ), skf ← FS.KeyGen(msk, f),
(f(m), σ) ← FS.Sign(skf ,m) that |σ| ≤ s(λ, |f(m)|). In particular, the size of σ is independent of
the function’s size, |f |, and the function’s input size, |m|.
Succinct Functional Signatures from O-SNARKs. In the following we show a construction
for message space M and family of functions F = {f : Df →M} whose running time is bounded
by some fixed polynomial tF (|m|). To build the scheme, we use two UF-CMA-secure signature
schemes, Σ0 = (kg0, sign0, vfy0) for message space M0 and Σ′ = (kg′, sign′, vfy′) for message space
D, together with a fully succinct zero-knowledge O-SNARK Π = (Gen,Prove,Ver) for the NP
language L defined below. While in [BGI14] a single signature scheme is used, we prefer to use
two different ones as this allows for a more precise statement since we will need to apply different
restrictions to M0 and D to obtain a precise proof.
Defining the relation RL. Let ML be a random-access machine as defined below, and tL(k) =
keL be a polynomial. RL is the binary relation consisting of all pairs (y, w) such that, parsing
y = (ML, x, t), ML(x,w) accepts in at most t steps and t ≤ tL(|x|). The values x are of the form
x = (m∗,mvk0) where mvk0 is a public key of the scheme Σ0, and m
∗ ∈ M is a message. The
values w are instead tuples w = (m, f, vk′, σvk′ , σm) such that m ∈ Df with Df ⊂ D, and σvk′ , σm
are signatures for the schemes Σ0 and Σ
′ respectively. On input such a pair (x,w), ML(x,w) is the
random-access machine that accepts iff the following conditions (1)&(2)&(3) hold:
(1) m∗ = f(m)
(2) vfy′(vk′,m, σm) = 1
(3) vfy0(mvk0, f |vk′, σvk′) = 1
Given polynomial bounds on the running times of verification algorithms vfy′ and vfy0, and a (fixed)
bound tF (·) on the size and running time of every f ∈ F , one can deduce a polynomial time bound
tL(|x|) = |x|eL for the machine ML.
The construction. Using the signature schemes Σ0, Σ
′ and a fully-succinct zero-knowledge
O-SNARK Π for NP, we construct the functional signature scheme FS[Σ0, Σ
′, Π] = (FS.Setup,
FS.KeyGen,FS.Sign,FS.Ver) as follows:
FS.Setup(1λ) :
Generate a pair of keys for Σ0: (msk0,mvk0)← kg0(1λ).
Generate a crs for Π: crs← Gen(1λ).
Set the master secret key msk = msk0, and the master verification key mvk = (mvk0, crs).
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FS.KeyGen(msk, f) :
Generate a new key pair (sk′, vk′)← kg′(1λ) for the scheme Σ′.
Compute σvk′ ← sign0(msk0, f |vk′), and let the certificate c be c = (f, vk′, σvk′).
Output skf = (sk
′, c).
FS.Sign(mvk, f, skf ,m) :
Parse skf as (sk
′, c = (f, vk′, σvk′)).
Sign m using sk′ in Σ′: σm ← sign′(sk′,m).
Set y = (ML, x, t) with x = (mvk0, f(m)), t = |x|eL), and w = (m, f, vk′, σvk′ , σm).
Run π←Prove(crs, y, w) and output (m∗ = f(m), π).
FS.Ver(mvk,m∗, π) :
Parse mvk = (mvk0, crs) and set y = (ML, x, t) where x = (mvk0,m
∗) and t = |x|eL .
Output the same bit returned by VereL(crs, y, π).
Correctness. It is not hard to see that as long as Σ0, Σ
′ and Π are correct, then FS is also correct.
Succinctness. This property immediately follows from the succinctness of Π.
Unforgeability. We prove the security of FS under the unforgeability of schemes Σ0 and Σ
′ and
using the notion of O-SNARKs for a specific family of oracles OmΣ,Q that we define below.
OmΣ,Q is parametrized by the algorithms of the signature schemes Σ0, Σ′ and by a polynomial
Q = Q(λ). Every member O of OmΣ,Q is described by a set of secret keys msk0, sk′1, . . . , sk′Q (i.e.,
the process of sampling O ← O consists of running (mvk0,msk0)
$← kg0(1λ) and (vk′i, sk′i)
$←
kg′1(1
λ), ∀i ∈ [Q]). The oracle O works as follows:
O(i, ‘vk′) =
{








(Cnt, sign0(msk0,m|vk′Cnt)),Cnt←Cnt + 1 If i = 0 and Cnt ≤ Q,
⊥ If i = 0 and Cnt > Q,
sign′(sk′i,m) otherwise.
For the sake of simplicity we compactly denote O0(·) = O(0, ·) and O′i(·) = O(i, ·) for all i > 0.
From the above description, note that oracle O0 is stateful and we assume it starts with Cnt = 1.
Finally, we point out that for some technical reasons that we mention in Remark 5 at the end
of this section, it is not possible to use the notion of O-SNARK for a single signing oracle to prove
the security of the functional signature scheme. This is the reason why we explicitly considered
O-SNARKs for this more complex family of multiple signing oracles.
Theorem 10. If Π is an O-SNARK for OmΣ,Q for every Q = poly(λ), and Σ0, Σ′ are UF-CMA-
secure, then FS[Σ0, Σ
′, Π] is an unforgeable functional signature.
Proof. Our proof consists of the following steps:
1. We show that for every successful AFS against the unforgeability of FS there exists an O-SNARK
adversary Ã for an oracle from OmΣ,Q such that Ã outputs a valid proof with the same (non-
negligible) probability of success of AFS. By the adaptive proof of knowledge for OmΣ,Q we then
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obtain that for such Ã there exists a suitable extractor EÃ that outputs a valid witness with all
but negligible probability.
2. From the previous point, considering adversary Ã and the corresponding extractor, we can
partition adversary-extractor pairs in two types: (1) those that yield a witness w containing a
pair (f, vk′) that was never signed before, and (2) those that yield w containing (f, vk′) that
was signed before. We show that adversaries of type (1) can be used to break the security of
the signature scheme Σ0, whereas adversaries of type (2) can be used to break the security of
Σ′.
Existence of an extractor for AFS. Consider any adversary AFS that while running in
ExpFS-UFAFS,FS it outputs (m
∗, π∗) and makes the experiment generate Q secret keys of the scheme
Σ′. For every such AFS we show there exists another adversary ÃO that, on input crs, and given
oracle O←OmΣ,Q, outputs a pair (y, π∗). We describe ÃO below. During its execution it maintains
a dictionary D similar to the one in the definition of ExpFS-UFAFS,FS, except that instead of storing
mappings like (f, i)→ skif , it maps a pair (f, i) to a triple (j, sk′, c) where j ∈ [Q]. Intuitively, this
means that a queried pair (f, i) is associated to oracle O′j .
ÃO(crs) :
Query mvk0←O0(‘vk′) and run A
Okey,Osign
FS (mvk = (crs,mvk0))
Simulate queries (f, i) to Okey as follows:
if [(f, i)→ (j, sk′, c)] ∈ D: output skif = (sk′, c)
else if [(f, i)→ (j, ·, c)] ∈ D:






ask (j, σvk′j )← O0(f), vk
′
j ← O′j(‘vk′), sk
′
j ← O′j(‘sk′)
add (f, i)→ (j, sk′j , c) to D with c = (f, vk′j , σvk′j )
output skif = (sk
′
j , c)
Simulate queries (f, i,m) to Osign as follows:
if (f, i) not assigned in D:
ask (j, σvk′j )← O0(f), vk
′
j ← O′j(‘vk′)
add (f, i)→ (j, ·, c) to D with c = (f, vk′j , σvk′j )
ask σm ← O′j(m)
set x = (mvk0, f(m)), t = |x|eL , w = (m, f, vk′j , σvk′j , σm)
run π ← Prove(prs, (ML, x, t), w)
output (f(m), π)
if [(f, i)→ (j, ·, c)] ∈ D: parse c = (f, vk′j , σvk′j )
ask σm ← O′j(m)
set x = (mvk0, f(m)), t = |x|eL , w = (m, f, vk′j , σvk′j , σm)
run π ← Prove(prs, (ML, x, t), w)
output (f(m), π)
When AFS outputs (m∗, π∗)
set y = (ML, x = (mvk0,m
∗), t = |x|eL)
output (y, π∗)
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As one can see, given the definition of oracles from OmΣ,Q, the simulation provided by Ã to AFS
is perfect. So, whenever AFS outputs a valid forgery Ã outputs a pair (y, π∗) that verifies correctly.
Moreover, defined in this way, the adversary ÃO fits the definition of adaptive proof of knowledge
for OmΣ,Q by which we know that there exists an extractor EÃ that, given the same input of Ã
O
and the transcript of oracle queries/answers made and received by ÃO, outputs a witness w such
that the probability that (y, π∗) verifies and (y, w) /∈ RL is negligible.
We define the following hybrid games that involve running Ã, EÃ:
G1 is the same experiment as O-AdPoK(λ, Ã, EÃ,OmΣ,Q) except that its outcome is defined differ-
ently. G1 outputs 1 iff Ver(crs, y, π) = 1 and the value m
∗ inside y constitutes a forgery according
to the oracle queries made by Ã during the game.
By construction of Ã from AFS it holds
Pr[ExpFS-UFAFS,FS(λ) = 1] = Pr[G1⇒ 1] (1)
G2 is the same as G1 except that in order to output 1 it additionally checks that (y, w) ∈ RL.
Essentially, the outcome of G2 differs from that of G1 only if in G2 (y, w) /∈ RL. Hence,
Pr[G1⇒ 1]− Pr[G2⇒ 1] ≤ Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, Ã, EÃ,OmΣ,Q)⇒ 1] (2)
Moreover, let us define the following two events in game G2.
Let w = (m, f, vk′, σvk′ , σm) be the witness returned by EÃ:
Ev1 occurs if ∀j ∈ [Q] : vk′ 6= vk′j , or ∃j ∈ [Q] : vk′ = vk′j but Ã never made a query O0(f) that
returned (j, ·);
Ev2 occurs if vk
′ = vk′j for some j ∈ [Q] and Ã did make a query (j, σ)←O0(f).
Clearly it holds
Pr[G2⇒ 1] = Pr[G2⇒ 1 ∧ Ev1] + Pr[G2⇒ 1 ∧ Ev2] (3)
In the remaining part of the proof we show that both Pr[G2⇒ 1 ∧ Ev1] and Pr[G2⇒ 1 ∧ Ev2]
are negligible under the assumption that, respectively, Σ0 and Σ
′ are unforgeable.




Proof. Let AFS be an adversary that runs in ExpFS-UFAFS,FS(λ), and let Ã, EÃ be the pair of algorithms
built out of AFS as defined before. Below we show how to build an efficient forger F0 out of Ã, EÃ
so that its probability of forging against Σ0 is at least Pr[G2⇒ 1∧E1]. F0 gets the public key mvk0
and has access to oracle OΣ0 = sign0(msk0, ·).
FOΣ00 (mvk0) :




$← kg′(1λ) ∀i ∈ [Q]
Generate crs = (prs, vst)← Gen(1λ) and run ÃO(crs)




i and add all queries-answers to qt
Simulate queries O0(m) as follows:
if m = ‘vk′: output mvk0
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else:
ask σ ← OΣ0(m|vk′Cnt)
add (m|vk′j , σ) to qt, and add m|vk′j to T
increment Cnt← Cnt + 1
output σ
Let (y, π∗) be Ã’s output
Run w ← EÃ(crs, qt)
Check that (y, w) ∈ RL:
[ Fail ] Abort if this does not hold.
Else parse w = (m, f, vk′, σvk′ , σm) and proceed:
[A] If (f |vk′) /∈ T return (f |vk′, σvk′).
[B] If (f |vk′) ∈ T abort.
Algorithm F0 can perfectly simulate G2 to Ã and EÃ. Furthermore, it is easy to see that if G2
outputs 1 and Ev1 occurs, then F0’s simulation ends up exactly in case (A), that is F0 returns a
signature σvk′ on a new message f |vk′. Since (y, w) ∈ RL one has that σvk′ is valid, and thus is a
forgery.
Finally, it is worth noting that for this simulation the adversary Ã can even ask O′j(‘sk′) for all
j oracles without affecting our reduction. ut
Claim 2 For every efficient adversary AFS there is an efficient forger F ′ such that Pr[G2 ⇒ 1 ∧
Ev2] ≤ Q ·AdvUF-CMAF ′,Σ′ (λ).
Proof. Let AFS be an adversary that runs in ExpFS-UFAFS,FS(λ), and let Ã, EÃ be the pair of algorithms
built out of AFS as defined before. Below we show how to build an efficient forger F ′ out of Ã, EÃ
so that its probability of forging against Σ′ is at least Pr[G2⇒ 1∧ Ev2]/Q. F ′ gets a public key vk′
and has access to oracle OΣ′ = sign′(sk′, ·).
F ′O′(vk′) :
Initialize qt← ∅, T ← ∅, Cnt← 0
Generate crs = (prs, vst)← Gen(1λ)
Generate a pair (msk0,mvk0)← kg0(1λ)
Choose a random q




$← kg′(1λ) ∀i ∈ [Q] \ {q}
Run ÃO(crs)
Simulate all queries to O0 using mvk0,msk0:
add all queries-answers to qt and all signed messages m|vk′ to T




i for all i ∈ [Q] \ {q}
add all queries-answers to qt
Simulate queries O′q(m) as follows:
if m = ‘vk′: output vk′ and add (‘vk′, vk′) to qt
else if m = ‘sk′: Abort
else: ask σ ← OΣ′(m) and add (m,σ) to qt
output σ
Let (y, π∗) be Ã’s output
Run w ← EÃ(crs, qt)
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Check that (y, w) ∈ RL:
[ Fail ] Abort if this does not hold.
Else parse w = (m, f, vk∗, σvk∗ , σm) and proceed:
[A] If (f |vk∗) /∈ T Abort.
[B] If (f |vk∗) ∈ T and vk∗ 6= vk′ Abort.
[C] If (f |vk∗) ∈ T and vk∗ = vk′ return (m,σm).
As one can see, unless it aborts, algorithm F ′ can perfectly simulate G2 to Ã and EÃ. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to see that if G2 outputs 1, Ev2 occurs, and there is no abort while answering
queries, then the simulation of F ′ ends up in cases (B) or (C). However since (f |vk∗) ∈ T , we have
that vk∗ = vk′j for some j ∈ [Q] (where we let vk′q = vk′). So, if there is no abort at all, we have
that vk∗ = vk′ and thus F ′ returns a valid signature σ on a message m (recall that validity follows
from (y, w) ∈ RL). By definition of G2 we also have that if it outputs 1, then the message m∗ in
y constitutes a forgery according to the definition of ExpFS-UF. In particular, it holds that for the
given f |vk′, there was no signing query O′q(m) such that m∗ = f(m). Therefore, if m is such that
m∗ = f(m) (again this follows from (y, w) ∈ RL), then m cannot have been queried to O′q, i.e.,
F ′ never queried m to its signing oracle. From this we have that, as long as G2 outputs 1, Ev2
occurs and there is no abort, then F ′ outputs a valid forgery. To conclude the proof, we observe
that F ′ does not abort with probability 1/Q which is the probability that the guess of q, for which
vk∗ = vk′, is correct. Therefore, we have that AdvUF-CMAF ′,Σ′ (λ) = Pr[G2⇒ 1 ∧ Ev2]/Q.
Finally, we note that the above proof works even if the adversary Ã queriesO′j(‘sk′) on all oracles
but the q-th one. This observation will be useful when we discuss the existence of O-SNARKs for
this oracle family. ut
Putting together the bounds in equations (1), (2) and (3), with the results of Claims 1 and 2,
eventually we obtain:
Pr[ExpFS-UFAFS,FS(λ) = 1] ≤ Pr[O-AdPoK(λ, Ã, EÃ,OmΣ,Q)⇒ 1] + Adv
UF-CMA
F0,Σ0 (λ) + Adv
UF-CMA
F ′,Σ′ (λ)
which shows that any efficient adversary has at most negligible probability of breaking the security
of scheme FS under the assumption that Π is an O-SNARK for OmΣ,Q and the schemes Σ0, Σ′ are
unforgeable. ut
Non-adaptive unforgeability. Similarly to the homomorphic signature case, it is possible to show
that the functional signature scheme achieves security against (functional signature) adversaries
that make non-adaptive signing queries (i.e., all queries are declared at the beginning of the game).
This weaker security can be proven assuming that Π is a non-adaptive O-SNARK (see Definition
8). Combining this change with the result of Theorem 2 we obtain the following:
Theorem 11. If Π is a SNARK and Σ0, Σ
′ are UF-CMA-secure signature schemes, then FS[Σ0, Σ
′, Π]
is a functional signature where unforgeability holds against adversaries that make non-adaptive sign-
ing queries.
Proof. The proof of the theorem can be obtained via straightforward modifications to the proof of
Theorem 10. Having in mind the intuition provided earlier, the main idea is that to work with non-
adaptive adversaries, one can define a non-adaptive O-SNARK adversary Ã for every non-adaptive
functional signature adversary A. In particular, the non-adaptive queries of A can be used to define
the non-adaptive queries of Ã. The rest of the proof proceeds analogously.
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Function privacy. We show that the functional signature construction satisfies function privacy
provided that the O-SNARK is zero-knowledge.
Theorem 12. If Π is a zero-knowledge O-SNARK then FS satisfies function privacy.
Proof. We show that for every adversaryApriv against the function privacy experiment ExpFS-FPriApriv,FS(λ),
we can construct a distinguisher algorithm D against the zero knowledge property of Π.
Consider the following two hybrid experiments:
G0 is the same as Exp
FS-FPri
Apriv,FS(λ). In particular, the crs for Π is generated honestly using Gen;
and the challenge functional signature σ = (fb(mb)) is generated as σ ← FS.Sign(skfb ,mb),
i.e., by running π ← Prove(prs, (ML, x, t), w) where x = (mvk0, fb(mb)), t = |x|eL , and w =
(mb, fb, vk
′, σvk′ , σ).
G1 is the same as G0 except that one uses the zero-knowledge simulator algorithm S in order to
generate both the crs and the proof in the challenge. Namely, (prs, vst, tr)←Scrs(1λ), and the
challenge signature is generated by running π←SProve(aux , prs, (ML, x, t), tr) for x = (mvk0,m′),
t = |x|eL , where m′ = f0(m0) = f1(m1).
Denote by win0 and win1 the advantage of the adversary Apriv in guessing the bit b in G0,
and G1, respectively. Clearly win1 = 1/2 since the bit b is not used at all, and thus the view of
Apriv is independent of b. To complete the proof we show that under the assumption that Π is
zero-knowledge, the following holds:
Claim 3 win0 − win1 ≤ negl(λ).
To prove this, we show that for any Apriv such that win0 − win1 = ε is non-negligible there is a
distinguisher D that succeeds against the zero-knowledge property of Π with the same advantage
ε. D is defined as follows:
D(crs) :
Generate a pair (msk0,mvk0)← kg0(1λ)
Run Apriv(mvk = (crs,mvk0))
Apriv adaptively chooses function queries f0, f1 and message pairs m0,m1
such that f0(m0) = f1(m1):
For each fb asked by Apriv, return the secret key skfb ← FS.KeyGen(msk, fb)
To answer the challenge D proceeds as follows:
pick b
$← {0, 1}
set x = (mvk0, fb(mb)), t = |x|eL , and w = (mb, fb, vk′, σvk′ , σ)
output (y, w) (where y = (ML, x, t)) to its challenger, and get back π
return (fb(mb), π) to Apriv
Let b′ be Apriv’s output
If b′ = b output 1, else output 0.
Note that when D receives crs and π that are generated using the real algorithms, then D
is perfectly simulating G0 to Apriv. Otherwise, if D receives crs and π that are generated using
the simulator, then D perfectly simulates G1. Therefore it is easy to see that D’s advantage is
win0 − win1.
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Remark 4 (On the applicability of Corollary 1). For the same reasons discussed in Remark 3, it is
not possible to apply the result of Corollary 1 to conclude the that the (adaptive) security of the
functional signature scheme holds under classical SNARKs.
Remark 5. [On the use of multiple signing oracles] In order to prove the security of the functional
signature scheme, one might be tempted to use the notion of O-SNARK with a single signing oracle.
Precisely, one might use O-SNARKs for OΣ0 when making a reduction to Σ0 and O-SNARKs for
OΣ′ when making a reduction to Σ′. Unfortunately, this approach does not work for an intricate
technical reason that we explain here. Intuitively, assume that one wants to build an O-SNARK
adversary Ã that has access to a single signing oracle, say from OΣ0 . Then the secret keys needed
to simulate all the other oracles have to be given to Ã as part of its auxiliary input (Ã needs
them to simulate AFS). At this point the issue is that such secret keys in fact give an efficient
way to compute a witness for several y in the relation RL. Therefore, if the extractor gets these
secret keys as auxiliary information, we then have no guarantee that, while doing a reduction to the
unforgeability of the signature scheme, the extractor will output a witness of the form we expect.
5.3 SNARKs on authenticated data
As another application of O-SNARKs we consider the generic construction of SNARKs on authen-
ticated data that is given in [BBFR15]. Since this construction is very similar to the homomorphic
signature scheme that we present in Section 5.1, we only provide an informal discussion of this
application. In [BBFR15] Backes et al. introduce the notion of SNARKs on authenticated data to
capture in an explicit way the possibility of performing (zero-knowledge) proofs about statements
that are authenticated by third parties, i.e., to prove that (x,w) ∈ R for some x for which there is a
valid signature. While the main focus of that work is on a concrete construction based on quadratic
arithmetic programs, the authors also show a generic construction based on SNARKs and digital
signatures. Roughly speaking, this construction consists in letting the prover use a SNARK to prove
a statement of the form “∃x,w, σ : (x,w) ∈ R ∧ vfy(vk, τ |x, σ) = 1”, for some public label τ of the
statement. The formalization of their model is rather similar to that of homomorphic signatures
in this paper (e.g., they also use labels). Noticeable differences are that their construction uses
pre-processing SNARKs for arithmetic circuit satisfiability, and that to handle several functions
they use different SNARK instantiations (one per function).
In [BBFR15] the security proof of this generic construction is only sketched, and in particular
they use the existence of an extractor for an adversary that interacts with a signing oracle without
providing a particular justification on its existence. With a more careful look, it is possible to see
that this security proof incurs the same issue of extraction in the presence of oracles. Using the
same techniques that we developed in this paper for the homomorphic signature scheme,15 it is
possible to prove the security of that generic construction using O-SNARKs for signing oracles
(or non-adaptive security based on classical SNARKs). In conclusion, for this construction one
can either conjecture that a specific SNARK scheme (e.g., [PHGR13]) is secure in the presence of
oracles, or, more conservatively, argue only the non-adaptive security of the primitive under the
existence of classical SNARKs.
15 The only major difference is that one has to consider a specification of our definitions to the case of pre-processing
SNARKs.
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A digital signature scheme Σ consists of a triple of algorithms Σ = (kg, sign, vfy) working as follows:
kg(1λ) the key generation takes as input the security parameter λ and returns a pair of keys (sk, vk).
sign(sk,m) on input a signing key sk and a message m, the signing algorithm produces a signature
σ.
vfy(vk,m, σ) given a triple vk,m, σ the verification algorithm tests if σ is a valid signature on m
with respect to verification key vk.
The standard security notion for digital signatures, unforgeability against chosen-message attacks
(UF-CMA, for short) is defined by the following experiment:





If vfy(vk,m∗, σ∗) = 1 and m∗ is “new” then output 1
Else output 0
A message (m∗ is said “new” if it is different from all the messages mi that the adversary queried
to the signing oracle sign(sk, ·) during the experiment. The advantage of a forger F in break-
ing the unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (SUF-CMA) of Σ is AdvSUF-CMAF ,Σ (λ) =
Pr[ExpSUF-CMAF ,Σ (λ) = 1].
Definition 13 (SUF-CMA security). A digital signature scheme Σ is UF-CMA-secure if for any
PPT forger F , AdvSUF-CMAF ,Σ (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
A stronger notion of security is strong unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (SUF-CMA).
This notion is defined by considering a security experiment slightly different than ExpUF-CMAF ,Σ (λ).
Instead of checking whether m∗ is “new”, one checks whether the pair (m∗, σ∗) is “new”, i.e., if
(m∗, σ∗) is different from all the pairs (mi, σi) obtained by F from the signing oracle.
A.2 Universal One-Way Hash Functions
Let us recall the notion of universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) families [NY89]. Let λ denote
the security parameter.
Definition 14 (Universal one-way hash family). A collection of function families H = {H}λ
where each H is a function family H = {h : {0, 1}q(λ) → {0, 1}`(λ)} is an universal one-way hash
family if:
Efficient. The functions q(λ) and `(λ) are polynomially-bounded; furthermore, given λ and x ∈
{0, 1}q(λ) the value h(x) can be computed in poly(λ) time.
Compressing. For all λ we have that q(λ) > `(λ).
Universal one-way. For all PPT algorithms A, the following is negligible (in λ):
Pr[x← A(1λ);h $← H;x′←A(1λ, h, x) : x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}q(λ) ∧ x 6= x′ ∧ h(x) = h(x′)].
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B The SNARK definition used in [BGI14]
Here we recall the definition of SNARK considered in the work of Boyle, Goldwasser and Ivan
[BGI14]. This definition is almost the same as our Definition 3 except that adaptive proof of
knowledge is formulated as follows:
– (Strong) Adaptive Proof of Knowledge. Π is a SNARK for a language L ∈ NP with
witness relation R if there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all PPT provers A
there exists a PPT algorithm EA = (E1A, E2A) such that:
(i) for every D
∣∣∣Pr [D(crs, vst) = 1 (crs, vst)←Gen(1λ)]− Pr [D(crs, vst) = 1 (crs, vst, td)←E1A(1λ)]∣∣∣ = µ(λ)
and (ii)
Pr
Ver(crs, y, π) = 1 (crs, td)←E1A(1λ)∧ (y, π)←A(crs)
(y, w) 6∈ R w←E2A(td, crs, y, π)
 = µ(λ)
where the probabilities are taken over (crs, td)←E1A(1λ, T ) and the random coins of E2A.
Besides the fact that the extractor can take as additional input the trapdoor td, a major difference
between this definition and the more standard one seems that in the above definition the extractor
E2A does not necessarily take the random tape of A as part of its input. To the best of our knowledge,
we are not aware of constructions under this definition, in the standard model.
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